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I. Introduction
Traditionally, the United States has been unforgiving to those 
who leak its secret, sensitive information to the public.  Its attitude 
toward those who publish information provided by leakers—
especially those who try to protect the identity of their sources—is 
also often hostile. 
The fate of Pfc. Bradley Manning will unfold in the shadow of 
previous American experiences with leaks and leakers.  Manning is 
the U.S. soldier suspected of disgorging unprecedented amounts of 
* Sandra Davidson, Ph.D., J.D., teaches media law at the University of Missouri
School of Journalism and School of Law.  She is also the attorney for the Columbia 
Missourian, the newspaper published by the School of Journalism.  She gratefully 
acknowledges the help of her teaching assistant, David Herrera, in the preparation of this 
article. 
28 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [34:1
classified military and diplomatic reports to WikiLeaks.  WikiLeaks, 
in turn, published the documents on its website and in conjunction 
with news media outlets around the world.1 
The purpose of this article is to sketch the historical context in 
which Manning (or whoever actually leaked the documents), 
WikiLeaks, and the news organizations associated with them find 
themselves. 
This article begins by reviewing how Manning reportedly 
obtained the documents he gave to WikiLeaks, how authorities were 
led to him, and his treatment since his arrest.  It then reviews several 
decades of legal action surrounding leaks, leakers, and journalists in 
the United States.  Throughout, this article suggests similarities and 
differences between Manning’s case and previous cases. 
This article thus provides an overview of how much of the 
territory in which the legal community finds itself in the age of 
WikiLeaks is without reference point in the past.  It also suggests how 
much of what is happening is an evolution from previous incidents, 
and how the past might prove instructive today. 
II. Bradley Manning and Release of
WikiLeaks Material Online 
On July 25, 2010, WikiLeaks released an avalanche of secret U.S. 
military intelligence and incident reports from the Afghanistan war,2 
in one of the largest leaks of classified data in U.S. history. 
WikiLeaks gave three major publications—The New York Times, 
London’s Guardian newspaper, and Der Spiegel in Germany—access 
1. News media and journalists have been unusually quick to release book-length
reports on WikiLeaks, Bradley Manning, and the drama surrounding the release of 
material throughout 2010. See, e.g., DAVID LEIGH AND LUKE HARDING, WIKILEAKS: 
INSIDE JULIAN ASSANGE’S WAR ON SECRECY (2011); THE NEW YORK TIMES STAFF, 
OPEN SECRETS: WIKILEAKS, WAR, AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY (2011); GREG 
MITCHELL, BRADLEY MANNING: TRUTH AND CONSEQUENCES (2011); MITCHELL, THE 
AGE OF WIKILEAKS: FROM COLLATERAL MURDER TO CABLEGATE (AND BEYOND) 
(2011).  News specials have also proliferated; see CNN Presents Wiki Wars (CNN 
television broadcast June 12, 2011), available at http://all-shares.com/download/g14394321-
cnn-presents-wiki-wars-the-mission-of-julian-assange-hdtv-xvi-af.avi.html, and WikiSecrets 
(PBS Frontline television broadcast May 24, 2011), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/ 
pages/frontline/wikileaks/etc/transcript.html. 
2. The reports are known as the Afghan War Diary or the Afghan War Logs.  See
Afghanistan: The War Logs, GUARDIAN (July 25, 2010 5:00 PM), available in part at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/2010/jul/25/wikileaks-afghanistan-data. 
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to the files before releasing them online, and the three news 
organizations prepared several reports to coincide with the release.3 
Two months prior, WikiLeaks released “Collateral Murder,” a 
video showing a U.S. air attack that killed twelve people in Baghdad.4  
WikiLeaks released hundreds of thousands of additional military and 
3. See A Note to Readers—Piecing Together the Reports, and Deciding What to
Publish, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2010, at A8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/26/ 
world/26editors-note.html.  See also Ki Price, The Man Who Spilled the Secrets, VANITY 
FAIR, Feb. 2011, at 92.  On The Guardian’s sifting through the information, see, e.g., CNN 
Presents Wiki Wars, supra note 1.  On July 26, 2010, Der Spiegel announced:  “In an 
unprecedented development, close to 92,000 classified documents pertaining to the war in 
Afghanistan have been leaked. Der Spiegel, The New York Times and The Guardian have 
analyzed the raft of mostly classified documents. The war logs expose the true scale of the 
Western military deployment . . ..” Matthias Gebauer et al., Explosive Leaks Provide 
Image of War from Those Fighting It, SPIEGEL ONLINE, July 25, 2010, http://www.spiegel. 
de/international/world/0,1518,708314,00.html.  And The  Guardian gave a blow-by-blow 
account of the release of the documents.   See Afghanistan War Logs: As it Happened, 
GUARDIAN, July 26, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/blog/2010/jul/26/afghanistan-
war-logs-wikileaks.  On October 22, 2010, the Iraq War Logs hit the Internet.  On the 
value of the WikiLeaks’ War Logs, Dean Baquet, the Assistant Managing Editor of the 
New York Times, said:  “It was a remarkable insight. I mean, it was an unvarnished, rich 
portrait of the daily conduct of two wars. I would argue that you came away with stuff you 
didn’t get in the Pentagon Papers because of the—the rawness of the information, the 
sheer day-to-day mundane life of war.”  The Guardian even created a “Datablog: every 
death mapped” of Iraqi deaths.  Iraq War Logs: How Civilians Have Paid Heaviest Price: 
Leaked Military Files Analyzed by the Guardian Reveal Secret U.S. Tally of Iraqi Deaths, 
GUARDIAN, Oct. 22, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/video/2010/oct/22/iraq-war-
logs.  And Der Spiegel said: 
 In the greatest leak in the history of the United States military, 
WikiLeaks is publishing 391,832 classified documents on the Iraq war on 
the Internet. The field reports from soldiers cast a new light on the war—
documenting in a unique way how the highly armed American military 
was helpless in the conflict for years. 
Spiegel Staff, The WikiLeaks Iraq War Logs:  Greatest Data Leak in US Military History, 
SPIEGEL ONLINE, Oct. 22, 2010, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518, 
724845,00.html.  Assange wanted to cloak himself in First Amendment protection by 
having The NewYork Times publish first.  He said:  “We insisted on bringing in The New 
York Times. We also insisted on The New York Times publishing first. So if there was any 
debate before a jury about, had it been published first in a foreign publication or a U.S. 
publication, it would be very clear it was published first in a U.S. publication.” 
WikiSecrets, supra note 1.  On Assange’s strategy to receive First Amendment protection, 
see, e.g., David Carr, Behind War Logs, A New Kind of Alliance, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 
2010, http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/26/behind-war-logs-a-new-kind-of-
alliance/. 
4. See COLLATERAL MURDER, http://www.collateralmurder.com/ (last visited May
15, 2011).  Although WikiLeaks opened in 2007, “Collateral Murder” was the website’s 
most prominent release of material.  See, e.g., Noam Cohen and Brian Stelter, Iraq Video 
Brings Notice to a Web Site, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/ 
04/07/world/07wikileaks.html. 
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diplomatic documents by year’s end,5 including the Iraq War Logs.  In 
April 2011 it released secret files on the military prison in 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.6  And on August 24, 2011, WikiLeaks 
announced it would release 35,000 more diplomatic cables.7 
In keeping with a policy of protecting their sources, WikiLeaks 
and its leader, Julian Assange,8 have not said how they obtained the 
documents.9  The website did say, however, that WikiLeaks had 
offered Manning legal assistance.10 
5. WIKILEAKS, http://www.wikileaks.ch (last visited Oct. 11, 2011).  The second
batch of military documents, from Iraq, are known to WikiLeaks as the Iraq War Logs, 
although some organizations, such as The New York Times, now refer to the collective set 
of Iraq and Afghanistan reports as The War Logs. WikiLeaks again allowed The New 
York Times, Guardian, and Der Spiegel early access to the Iraq documents, but it also 
granted early access to other global media, including France’s Le Monde newspaper and 
the Qatar-based Al Jazeera network.  See, e.g., David Leigh, Iraq war logs:  WikiLeaks v. 
Washington, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, Oct. 22, 2010.  See also, Price, supra note 3, at 92. 
On the 251,287 diplomatic documents, see, e.g., Scott Shane & Andrew W. Lehren, State’s 
Secrets: Leaked Cables Offer a Raw Look Inside U.S. Diplomacy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 
2010, at A1.  For more general information on Wikileaks and its activities, see Yochai 
Benkler, A Free Irresponsible Press: Wikileaks and the Battle over the Soul of the 
Networked Fourth Estate, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 311 (2011). 
6. WIKILEAKS, http://wikileaks.ch/gitmo/ (last visited Oct 11. 2011).
7. See, e.g., Amy Goodman and Juan Gonzalez, WikiLeaks Releases Tens of
Thousands of New Classified U.S. Diplomatic Cables, DEMOCRACY NOW!, Aug. 26, 2011, 
http://www.democracynow.org/2011/8/26/headlines/wikileaks_releases_tens_of_thousands
_of_new_cables; Melissa Jeltsen, WikiLeaks: 35,000 Diplomatic Cables To Be Released 
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 26, 2011), http://www.huffington post.com/2011/08/24/wikileaks-
35--diplom.  For more on what perhaps precipitated the timing of this WikiLeaks dump, 
see infra note 19. 
8. See, e.g., Raffi Khatchadourian, No Secrets, NEW YORKER, June 7, 2010, at 40 (an
extensive profile of Assange and his forming of WikiLeaks). 
9. Eric Schmitt, In Disclosing Secret Documents, WikiLeaks Seeks ‘Transparency’
N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2010, at A11.  See also Gaviria and Smith, supra note 1 (Assange says 
that WikiLeaks’ software design prevents identification of sources.  WikiLeaks’ 
technology does not collect sources, in line with Assange’s principle that, in his words, 
“the best way to keep a secret is to never have it.”)  On September 1, 2011, Assange did 
seem to say that David Leigh of The Guardian had pointed at Manning. 
10. Schmitt, supra note 9.  Manning also received public support from Daniel
Ellsberg, who leaked the Pentagon Papers in 1971, the last dramatic leak case that faced 
the U.S. government prior to the War Logs. Cf. New York Times v. United States, 403 
U.S. 713 (1971).  “Bradley Manning has been defending and supporting our constitution,” 
Ellsberg said. Chris McGreal, Campaign to Free Soldier who Leaked Afghan War Logs, 
GUARDIAN, Sept. 16, 2010, at 24.  Ellsberg also supported Assange.  He flew to London to 
appear at a news conference with Assange shortly after the leak of the Iraq war 
documents.  Pentagon demands for Assange to return any classified materials he 
possessed, according to Ellsberg, were couched in the same careful language that he heard 
after release of the Pentagon Papers.  “Secrecy is essential to empire,” Ellsberg 
commented.  John F. Burns and Ravi Somaiya, WikiLeaks Founder Gets Support in 
Rebuking U.S. on Whistle-Blowers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2010, at A12, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/24/world/24london.html. 
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The U.S. government was less reserved than WikiLeaks and 
Assange.  Not long after WikiLeaks released the Afghanistan files, 
the government declared Manning a “person of interest” in the leak.11 
The government had already arrested him on suspicion of leaking the 
helicopter video and diplomatic documents,12 and he was in custody 
In his December 10, 2010 interview with Amy Goodman on Democracy Now!, Ellsberg 
said of the WikiLeaks case: 
Well, in this case, as in the Pentagon Papers, I do give The New York 
Times credit for working with these materials and presenting material to 
their readers. And in fact . . . if they [government authorities] find a 
crime, or if they invent a crime or pass a . . . criminal law that would 
cover WikiLeaks, it will cover The New York Times, and you, Democracy 
Now!, and anyone who presents news that in part reflects leaks . . . 
unauthorized disclosures from within the government. 
Actually, the wording of the Espionage Act, which . . . was not intended 
for this purpose . . . is so broad that it applies to readers of this classified 
information . . . [T]hey’d have to return their copy of The New York 
Times, I guess, to the Justice Department. That actually is in line with 
what the government has been saying right now, directing its employees 
that they cannot download WikiLeaks or The New York Times sites that 
reports the WikiLeaks onto their computers at work or at home . . . 
We’re in an absurd position here with a close down of public discussion 
of official matters, very similar to that of China. In fact, I even wonder 
whether there’s a rule that absurd in China. 
Daniel Ellsberg’s interview with Amy Goodman, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Dec. 10, 2010), 
http://www.democracynow.org/2010/12/10/whistleblower_daniel_ellsberg_julian_assange_is. 
11. David S. Cloud, Army Officer a ‘Person of Interest,’  L.A. TIMES, July 28, 2010, at
A6. 
12. Elisabeth Bumiller, Army Broadens Inquiry Into Disclosure of Reports to
WikiLeaks, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2010, at A4.  Significant controversy surrounds how the 
military came to know of Manning and arrest him on May 26, 2010. 
In June 2010, Wired published extensive excerpts of an instant-message conversation 
allegedly between Manning and Adrian Lamo, a “former hacker.” Lamo eventually told 
the FBI and the Army about his chats with Manning. 
The excerpts portray Manning as confessing to stealing data from government computers 
while serving in Iraq, including the “Collateral Murder” video and diplomatic cables, 
which he then passed to WikiLeaks. “i can’t believe what im confessing to you,” Manning 
allegedly wrote.  The logs apparently include Manning’s descriptions of how he acquired 
the data: 
(01:54:42 PM) Manning: i would come in with music on a CD-RW [a re-
writable CD] 
(01:55:21 PM) Manning: labelled with something like “Lady Gaga”… 
erase the music . . . then write a compressed split file 
(01:55:46 PM) Manning: no-one suspected a thing 
(01:55:48 PM) Manning: =L kind of sad 
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when WikiLeaks released the Afghanistan files and subsequent 
material.13  
As well as Manning and Lamo discussing the lax security surrounding the 
supposedly highly secret material: 
(01:56:36 PM) Lamo: from a professional perspective, i’m curious how 
the server they were on was insecure 
(01:57:19 PM) Manning: you had people working 14 hours a day . . . 
every single day . . . no weekends . . . no recreation . . . 
(01:57:27 PM) Manning: people stopped caring after 3 weeks 
(01:57:44 PM) Lamo: i mean, technically speaking 
(01:57:51 PM) Lamo: or was it physical 
(01:57:52 PM) Manning: >nod< 
(01:58:16 PM) Manning: there was no physical security 
(01:58:18 PM) Lamo: it was physical access, wasn’t it 
(01:58:20 PM) Lamo: hah 
(01:58:33 PM) Manning: it was there, but not really 
(01:58:51 PM) Manning: 5 digit cipher lock . . . but you could knock and 
the door . . . 
(01:58:55 PM) Manning: *on 
(01:59:15 PM) Manning: weapons, but everyone has weapons 
(02:00:12 PM) Manning: everyone just sat at their workstations… 
watching music videos / car chases / buildings exploding . . . and writing 
more stuff to CD/DVD . . . the culture fed opportunities 
Kevin Poulsen & Kim Zetter, ‘I Can’t Believe What I’m Confessing to You’: The Wikileaks 
Chats, WIRED (June 10, 2010, 9:01 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/ 
06/wikileaks-chat/.  Later in 2010, Poulsen and Salon blogger Glenn Greenwald engaged in 
an extended debate about whether Wired needed to release the entire log of the chat 
between Manning and Lamo. Wired had released only 25 percent of the transcript, 
claiming that it held back portions that “discuss deeply personal information about 
Manning or that reveal apparently sensitive military information.”  Greenwald claimed 
that Wired needed to release the logs because Lamo had been claiming to news media that 
Manning did or did not tell Lamo certain things, which the logs would reveal, and which 
would clarify what Lamo could have told the government.  See Glenn Greenwald, The 
Worsening Journalistic Disgrace at Wired, SALON (Dec. 27, 2010, 4:28 PM), 
http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn_greenwald/2010/12/27/wired; Evan Hansen & 
Kevin Poulsen, Putting the Record Straight on the Lamo-Manning Chat Logs, WIRED 
(Dec. 28, 2010, 9:18 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/12/greenwald/; Glenn 
Greenwald, Response to Wired’s Accusations, SALON (Dec. 29, 2010, 8:01 AM), 
http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn_greenwald/2010/12/29/wired_response_1; Glenn 
Greenwald, Wired’s Refusal to Release or Comment on the Manning Chat Logs, SALON 
(Dec. 29, 2010, 8:30 AM), http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn_greenwald/2010/12/ 
29/wired_1. 
13. The New York Times, which has perhaps worked more closely with WikiLeaks
than has any other American news outlet, does not seem to be in the Administration’s 
crosshairs, according to the paper: 
Do you think that what you do is consistent with what you understand 
Assange and WikiLeaks did? Mr. Holder asked a reporter. “Would I 
have liked not to see the stuff appear? Yes. But did The Times act in a 
responsible way? I would say yes. I am not certain I would say that about 
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In early March 2011, the Army charged Manning with 22 counts, 
including aiding the enemy, which could carry a death sentence.14  
That month, Manning was placed under “prevention of injury watch,” 
which required him to be stripped naked nightly until an inspection in 
the morning.15 
After the news of Manning’s treatment broke, President Barack 
Obama said he had been assured by the Pentagon that Manning’s 
confinement met the United States’s “basic standards.” 
The administration struggled to straighten its stories, however. 
The day before President Obama spoke, P.J. Crowley, the State 
those people who were responsible for the initial leaks and the wholesale 
dumping of materials.” 
Charlie Savage, For Attorney General, New Congress Means New Headaches, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 31, 2010 at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/31/us/politics/ 
31holder.html.  The Times and other media, though, have worked with Assange and 
WikiLeaks, not Manning. Bill Keller, the top editor at the Times, wrote in January 2011 
that the newspaper “regarded Assange throughout as a source, not as a partner or 
collaborator, but he was a man who clearly had his own agenda.”  Bill Keller, Dealing with 
Assange and the Wikileaks Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2011, at 32, available at http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2011/01/30/magazine/30Wikileaks-t.html.  The release of the War Logs 
prompted key U.S. senators to announce that whatever proposals for federal shield laws 
for journalists emerged, the proposals would specifically exclude from shield-law coverage 
any organization that disseminated classified or confidential material but that did not add 
any reporting or context.  Paul Farhi, Wikileaks is Barrier to Shield Arguments, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 21, 2010, at C1.  Democratic senators who were working on shield law 
legislation are now “backpedaling from WikiLeaks,” and senators Charles Schumer (D-
N.Y.) and Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) are working on an amendment that will give shield 
protection to traditional news gathering but withhold it from websites that are used to 
disseminate secret information en masse.  See Charlie Savage, After Afghan War Leaks, 
Revision in a Shield Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2010, at 12, available at http://www.nytimes 
.com/2010/08/04/us/04shield.html (also describing WikiLeaks as “a confederation of open-
government advocates who solicit secret documents for publication”); see also John 
Eggerton, Is Shield Law the Next Wikileaks Victim? D.C. Debates Effects of Leaked Docs 
on Bill Protecting Journalists, BROAD. & CABLE (Dec. 5, 2010, 9:01 PM), 
http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/460623-Is_Shield_Law_the_Next_WikiLeaks_ 
Victim_.php. 
14. There was speculation that the ratcheting up of the charges was an attempt to
pressure Manning into a plea-bargaining agreement. See, e.g., David S. Cloud, Soldier in 
WikiLeaks Case Charged With Aiding the Enemy, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2011, 
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-wikileaks-manning-20110303,0,379 
8837.story. 
15. Manning was not, however, placed on suicide watch.  Charlie Savage, Soldier in
Leaks Case Will Be Made to Sleep Naked Nightly, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2011, at A8. 
According to Manning’s lawyer, the restriction began after Manning, frustrated with the 
conditions of his imprisonment, “sarcastically stated that if he wanted to harm himself, he 
could conceivably do so with the elastic waistband of his underwear or with his flip-flops.” 
David E. Coombs, The Truth Behind Quantico Brig’s Decision to Strip PFC Manning, THE 
LAW OFFICE OF DAVID E. COOMBS (Mar. 5, 2011, 12:39 PM), http://www.army 
courtmartialdefense.info/2011/03/truth-behind-quantico-brigs-decision-to.html. 
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Department spokesman, told a private audience that the restrictions 
against Manning were “ridiculous and counterproductive and 
stupid.”16  Crowley soon resigned.17 
In April 2011, the U.S. military moved Manning from the brig at 
Quantico, Virginia, to a military prison in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 
where he would have “a larger cell, plus several hours a day with the 
rest of the prison population for exercise, meals, and other activities,” 
according to The Christian Science Monitor.18 
In May 2011, a federal grand jury began hearing testimony to 
determine whether Assange and WikiLeaks could face prosecution 
under the 1917 Espionage Act.19 A leaked subpoena also said the 
16. See Ellen Nakashima, WikiLeaks Suspect’s Treatment ‘Stupid,’ U.S. Official Says,
WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2011/03/11/AR2011031106542.html. 
17. Crowley Quits Over Manning Comments, AL JAZEERA ENGLISH, (Mar. 13, 2011,
6:02 PM), http://english.aljazeera.net/news/americas/2011/03/201131317356184984.html. 
18. Brad Knickerbocker, Alleged ‘WikiLeaker’ Bradley Manning Sent to Less
Restrictive Prison, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR Apr. 21, 2011, http://www.csmonitor. 
com/USA/Justice/2011/0421/Alleged-WikiLeaker-Bradley-Manning-sent-to-less-restrictive- 
prison. 
While all this happened, authorities in Europe continued moving against Assange for 
allegations that he raped two women in Sweden.  Assange was released on bail, subject to 
curfew, in London while an extradition battle was fought in court.  In late February 2011, 
Assange lost his fight against extradition to Sweden.  Esther Addley, Make This Case 
Bigger Than Me, GUARDIAN, Feb. 24, 2011, at 3.  Assange promptly appealed, indefinitely 
delaying the extradition, which would have taken place within 10 days of the ruling against 
him.  “We have always known we would appeal,” he told the media after the ruling. 
James Meikle, Assange Starts Appeal Against Extradition to Sweden, GUARDIAN, Mar. 4, 
2011, at 10.  Ironically, Assange apparently complained that somebody leaked to The 
Guardian a copy of the Swedish police report about his alleged sexual transgressions.  See, 
e.g., Robert Barr, Leak Bothers Founder of Wikileaks; Police Report on Assange
Disclosed, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 22, 2010, at 7.
19. Ed Pilkington, WikiLeaks: US opens grand jury hearing, GUARDIAN, May 11,
2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2011/may/11/us-opens-wikileaks-grand-jury- hearing. 
On August 25, 2011, the group Citizens for Legitimate Government sent 
out an email that said, under the heading of “U.S. invokes Patriot Act as 
WikiLeaks dumps more data:” 
The U.S. government has reportedly invoked the controversial Patriot 
Act as a legal basis for demanding data from Internet provider Dynadot 
about WikiLeaks and Julian Assange.  The whistle-blowing organization 
[WikiLeaks] recently received a copy of the (now) unsealed court order, 
which was apparently signed by a U.S. magistrate judge on January 4, 
2011.   “Using the terms of the Patriot Act the order was issued to 
Dynadot, the domain registrars [sic] for wikileaks.org, for all information 
they hold on WikiLeaks, Julian Assange and wikileaks.org,” the 
organization confirmed in an official statement. 
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grand jury was considering a prosecution on grounds of “knowingly 
accessing a computer without authorization or exceeding authorized 
access” and “knowingly stealing or converting any record or thing of 
value of the United States or any department or agency thereof,” 
charges which, according to The Guardian, “would appear to 
point . . . in the direction of Bradley Manning.”20 
III. Classified Means Classified, But Unclassified Can Also
Count: Snepp, Marchetti, Plame-Wilson, The Progressive
The U.S. Supreme Court has not been kind to persons who leak 
information—even unclassified information, as illustrated in 1980 in 
Snepp v. United States.21 
CITIZENS FOR LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT (Aug. 25, 2011), http://www.legitgov.org/. 
However, Reuters said that a “U.S. official” had indicated that the court order had not 
been officially unsealed.  See WikiLeaks Publishes Tens of Thousands More Cables, 
REUTERS (Aug. 25, 2011, 9:20 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/26/us-
wikileaks-idUSTRE77O7PZ20110826.  Within hours of revealing on Twitter that 
Dynadot, a California Internet registrar that hosted WikiLeaks, had received and 
complied with the court order issuing from Alexandria, Virginia, WikiLeaks started 
dumping more diplomatic cables, Reuters reported.  Id.  The order demanded that 
Dynadot disclose “customer or subscriber account information for each account registered 
to or associated with Wikileaks, the individual Julian Assange, or the domain name 
wikileaks.org for the time period November 1, 2009 to present.”  In re Application of the 
United States of America for an Order Pursuant to  18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), Misc. No. 
10GJ3793 (E.D. Va., Jan. 4, 2011), reprinted by WikiLeaks, available at http:// 
wikileaks.org/IMG/pdf/Dynadot_2703_ d_Order.pdf. 
20. Pilkington, supra note 19; see also Greenwald, FBI Serves Grand Jury Subpoena
Likely Relating to WikiLeaks, SALON (Apr. 27, 2011, 1:28 PM), http://www.salon.com/ 
news/opinion/glenn_greenwald/radio/2011/04/27/wikileaks. 
21. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).  Nor has the Supreme Court been
good to parties requesting information that arguably fell under the “national security” 
umbrella.  In CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (1985), the Court ruled against ordering the CIA 
to release information about the CIA’s MKULTRA program.  The Court described this 
broad program as follows: 
Between 1953 and 1966, the Central Intelligence Agency financed a 
wide-ranging project, code-named MKULTRA, concerned with “the 
research and development of chemical, biological, and radiological 
materials capable of employment in clandestine operations to control 
human behavior.” The program consisted of some 149 subprojects that 
the Agency contracted out to various universities, research foundations, 
and similar institutions.  At least 80 institutions and 185 private 
researchers participated.  Because the Agency funded MKULTRA 
indirectly, many of the participating individuals were unaware that they 
were dealing with the Agency.  MKULTRA was established to counter 
perceived Soviet and Chinese advances in brainwashing and 
interrogation techniques.  Over the years the program included various 
medical and psychological experiments, some of which led to untoward 
results. 
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In 1968 during the Vietnam War, Frank Snepp went to work for 
the CIA.  As a condition of employment, Snepp had to agree to 
submit to the CIA for prior clearance any information on the CIA 
that he wanted to publish.  This was a lifetime agreement, and it was a 
precondition to his working at the CIA.  After leaving the CIA, 
Snepp published a book titled Decent Interval about the CIA’s 
activities during the Vietnam War, which had already ended.22  Not 
surprisingly, the CIA thought there was no “decent interval.” 
The government agreed that the book contained no classified 
information.23 Still, Snepp “violated his obligation to submit all 
material for prepublication review.”24 
The government wanted an injunction requiring Snepp to submit 
all his future writings for prior clearance.  The government also 
wanted all the profits from Snepp’s book.25  The government got 
both.26  During the trial, the director of the CIA testified that books 
such as Snepp’s had caused a number of foreign intelligence sources 
to discontinue providing information to the United States.27 
The Supreme Court’s per curiam opinion said that “even in the 
absence of an express agreement—the CIA could have acted to 
protect substantial government interests by imposing reasonable 
restrictions on employee activities that in other contexts might be 
protected by the First Amendment.”  The Court then identified two 
substantial government interests: “the government has a compelling 
interest in protecting both the secrecy of information important to 
our national security and the appearance of confidentiality so 
Id. at 161–62 (footnote omitted).  As for those “untoward results”: “Several MKULTRA 
subprojects involved experiments where researchers surreptitiously administered 
dangerous drugs, such as LSD, to unwitting human subjects.  At least two persons died as 
a result of MKULTRA experiments, and others may have suffered impaired health 
because of the testing.” Id. at 62 n.2.  In short, the CIA was testing the effectiveness of 
biological and chemical materials in changing human behavior, performing the tests on 
human guinea pigs without gaining their informed consent.  The Supreme Court upheld 
the CIA’s refusal to disclose names of MKULTRA researchers, invoking the “national 
security” exemption for “intelligence sources.”  Id. at 173.  Now a group of veterans is 
suing the CIA in federal court for information about alleged experiments on veterans.  On 
September 1, 2011, the veterans filed objections to the CIA’s motion for judgment on the 
pleadings.  See Vietnam Veterans of America v. CIA, No. CV 09-0037-CW, (N.D. Cal., 
Oct. 11, 2011), available at http://www.courthousenews.com/2011/08/01/Plaintiff%20 
Opposition%20to%20CIAs%20Motion%20to%20Dismiss.pdf. 
22. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 507–08.
23. Id. at 510.
24. Id. at 511.
25. Id. at 508–09.
26. Id. at 509, 515–16.
27. Id. at 512–13.
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essential to the effective operation of our foreign intelligence 
service.”  The CIA could impose “reasonable restrictions,” the Court 
said, and the agreement Snepp signed with the CIA was a 
“reasonable means” for protecting the government interests in 
secrecy of information and appearance of confidentiality.28 
In this case, none of the information that Snepp used in his book 
was classified, as the government conceded, so none of the 
information was secret.  Still, the “appearance of confidentiality” 
arguably posed a problem.  The CIA director testified that books 
such as Snepp’s were causing problems with intelligence sources who 
feared disclosure.29  Consequences of disclosure, of course, could be 
disastrous to these sources who arguably deserved protection.  The 
Court said: 
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals found that a 
former intelligence agent’s publication of unreviewed material 
relating to intelligence activities can be detrimental to vital 
national interests even if the published information is 
unclassified.  When a former agent relies on his own judgment 
about what information is detrimental, he may reveal 
information that the CIA—with its broader understanding of 
what may expose classified information and confidential 
sources—could have identified as harmful.  In addition to 
receiving intelligence from domestically based or controlled 
sources, the CIA obtains information from the intelligence 
services of friendly nations and from agents operating in 
foreign countries.  The continued availability of these foreign 
sources depends upon the CIA’s ability to guarantee the 
security of information that might compromise them and even 
endanger the personal safety of foreign agents.30 
And so the Supreme Court had to weigh and balance interests.31 
Justice John Paul Stevens, dissenting, said, “Inherent in this prior 
restraint is the risk that the reviewing agency will misuse its authority 
28. Id. at 510.
29. Id. at 512–13.
30. Id. at 511–12 (footnote omitted).
31. On Snepp, see, e.g., Judith Schenck Koffler & Bennett L. Gershman, Symposium,
National Security and Civil Liberties, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 816 (1984). 
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to delay the publication of a critical work or to persuade an author to 
modify the contents of his work beyond the demand of secrecy.”32 
United States v. Marchetti33 appears to illustrate Justice Stevens’ 
words about the risk of abuse by the reviewing agency.  Marchetti, a 
former CIA agent, was working on a manuscript.  The CIA heard 
about his work and got an injunction ordering the former CIA agent 
to submit his manuscript for CIA review.  The Fourth Circuit 
remanded the case, ordering that the injunction be limited to 
classified information.34  In doing so, however, the Fourth Circuit 
made clear, in a section heading, that “The Freedom of Speech and of 
the Press are not Absolute.”  The court said: “We readily agree with 
Marchetti that the First Amendment limits the extent to which the 
United States, contractually or otherwise, may impose secrecy 
requirements upon its employees and enforce them with a system of 
prior censorship.”  For example, the court said the First Amendment 
would not permit prior restraint of unclassified information or 
information the government had disclosed.  The court epmhasized, 
“we are here concerned with secret information touching upon the 
national defense and the conduct of foreign affairs, acquired by 
Marchetti while in a position of trust and confidence and 
contractually bound to respect it.”35 
The court, under the heading of “The Government has a Right to 
Secrecy,” pointed to the power and responsibility of the president. 
The court said, “Gathering intelligence information and the other 
activities of the Agency, including clandestine affairs against other 
nations, are all within the President’s constitutional responsibility for 
the security of the Nation as the Chief Executive and as Commander 
in Chief of our Armed forces.”36  The United States began in secrecy, 
the Court noted, as “[s]ecrecy governed the deliberations in 
Philadelphia in 1787.”37 
In Snepp, the Supreme Court commented that the government’s 
concession that Snepp’s work contained no classified information 
distinguished Snepp from Marchetti.38 
32. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 526 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Justices Brennan and Marshall
joined Stevens in this dissent). 
33. 466 F.2d 1309, (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
34. Id. at 1318.
35. Id. at 1313.
36. Id. at 1315.
37. Id. at 1316, (quoting Louis Henkin, The Right to Know and the Duty to Withhold:
The Case of the Pentagon Papers, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 271, 273–74 (1971)). 
38. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 510 n.4.
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Marchetti’s second appearance in front of the Fourth Circuit 
happened in the wake of the remand.  Marchetti collaborated with a 
former State Department employee, John Marks, to co-author a 
book, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence.  Alfred A. Knopf wanted 
to publish the book, but first the CIA reviewed the manuscript, per 
the first Fourth Circuit decision.  The CIA wanted to censor 339 
sections of the book.  After negotiations with Knopf, the CIA 
approved 168 deletions.39  The book publisher sued for release of the 
remaining deletions.  The district court approved deletion of only 26 
sections of the book.40 
Not waiting for the Fourth Circuit’s 1975 decision, Knopf 
published the book The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence in 1974 with 
168 blank spaces.  In the blank spaces repeatedly appears the notation 
“DELETED.”41 
In 2009, in Wilson v. CIA,42 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
denied the request by Valerie Plame Wilson and book publisher 
39. Fred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362, 1365 (4th Cir. 1975).
40. Id. at 1368.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit declared: 
We decline to modify our previous holding that the First Amendment is 
no bar against an injunction forbidding the disclosure of classifiable 
information within the guidelines of the Executive Orders when (1) the 
classified information was acquired, during the course of his 
employment, by an employee of a United States agency or department in 
which such information is handled and (2) its disclosure would violate a 
solemn agreement made by the employee at the commencement of his 
employment.  With respect to such information, by his execution of the 
secrecy agreement and his entry into the confidential employment 
relationship, he effectively relinquished his First Amendment rights. 
Id. at 1370.  The Fourth Circuit remanded the case, ordering the district judge to authorize 
only disclosure of classified information that Marchetti and Marks learned “unofficially 
after the termination of their employment.”  Id. at 1371. 
41. On Marchetti, see, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, Terrorist Speech and the Future of Free
Expression, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 233, 297–98 (2005); and Michael L. Charlson, The 
Constitutionality of Expanding Prepublication Review of Government Employees’ Speech, 
72 CAL. L. REV. 962, 990 (1984). 
The saga of Marchetti took yet another twist.  A seemingly exasperated Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, in a case brought by Martin Halperin, then Director for the Center for 
National Security Studies, said: “A continuing effort publicly to disclose classified 
information obtained by Victor Marchetti in his capacity as a highly placed official in the 
Central Intelligence Agency brings this simmering controversy before us for the third 
time.”  Colby v. Halperin, 656 F.2d 70, 71 (4th Cir. 1981).  Halperin had filed a Freedom of 
Information request for the material and so wanted the classified information released to 
his attorney.  The Fourth Circuit found “no compelling necessity” to release the 
information and thus denied the request.  Id. 
42. 586 F.3d 171, 173–74 (2d Cir. 2009).
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Simon & Schuster, Inc. to force the CIA to permit publication of 
certain information about her CIA employment in her memoir, Fair 
Game: My Life as a Spy, My Betrayal by the White House.  The CIA 
did not violate Wilson’s First Amendment rights, the court concluded, 
when its Publication Review Board forbade publication of any 
material about Wilson’s possible pre-2002 work for the CIA.43 
Another case that, like Snepp, involved no classified information, 
bubbled up in Madison, Wisconsin—United States v. Progressive, 
Inc.44  A monthly magazine, The Progressive, was set to publish an 
article titled, “The H-Bomb Secret: How We Got It, Why We’re 
Telling It.”  The U.S. government got a temporary restraining order 
after a hearing and then sought a preliminary injunction against 
publication of the article.  The judge called the situation “a clash 
43. Id. at 173. Whether Wilson worked for the CIA prior to 2002 has long been
undisputed.  In 2007, U.S. Rep. Jay Inslee (D-Wash.) introduced a bill in the House that 
would have allowed Wilson to receive retirement benefits from the CIA despite her not 
having reached the required age.  Inslee praised Wilson’s “20 years of service” on the floor 
of the House.  He also included in the Congressional Record, with Wilson’s permission, a 
copy of a letter sent to Wilson by the CIA that detailed her employment with the agency 
from 1985 to 2007.  Id. at 180–82.  No classification markings were on the letter when 
Wilson received it.  But three days after Inslee introduced the bill, Wilson received a 
second letter saying that the original communication “was not properly marked” and that 
its content “remains classified.”  No action was ever requested of Congress regarding its 
record.  Id. at 181.  When Simon & Schuster published Fair Game in 2007, it marked the 
redacted material by blacking out lines in the text.  It included a “Publisher’s Note” 
describing the reason for the redactions and reminding readers that the information in 
question “has already been widely disseminated.” The publisher also included an 
afterword, written by a reporter that provided essentially the same information as was 
censored.  Id. at 182–83.  The sagas of Judith Miller and Valerie Plame have spawned at 
least two movies.  Fair Game was adapted into a Hollywood film starring Naomi Watts as 
Valerie Wilson and Sean Penn as Joseph Wilson.  Critic Roger Ebert said the film was 
“unusually bold for a fictionalization based on real events.”  Roger Ebert, Fair Game, CHI. 
SUN-TIMES, Nov. 3, 2010, http://rogerebert.suntimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/ 
20101103/REVIEWS/101109993/1023.  In 2008, Nothing but the Truth, starring Kate 
Beckinsale, Matt Dillon, Angela Bassett, Alan Alda, and David Schwimmer, covered a lot 
of shield law as it told the story of a female reporter who reveals the name of an 
undercover CIA agent and then chooses to go to jail rather than disclose her source’s 
identity.  In the movie, the CIA agent is murdered, the reporter is badly beaten in jail, and 
the reporter’s case goes to the Supreme Court where the reporter’s attorney argues for 
Branzburg’s reversal.  The Court decides, again 5 to 4, in favor of national security instead 
of the First Amendment.  The movie has a surprise ending of sorts.  And yet another 
skirmish between the CIA and a book author erupted in the summer of 2011 when the 
CIA demanded that former CIA agent Ali H. Soufan make extensive cuts in his memoir. 
Soufan criticized the CIA, saying that it withheld information from the FBI about two 
men who became hijackers on 9/11 and that it engaged in unnecessarily brutal 
interrogation.  See, e.g., Scott Shane, C.I.A. Demands Cuts in Book About 9/11 and Terror 
Fight, N.Y.. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/26/us/26agent .html? 
pagewanted=all. 
44. 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
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between allegedly vital security interests of the United States and the 
competing constitutional doctrine against prior restraint in 
publication.”45  The bright author, Howard Morland, contended that 
he had merely synthesized material available to anyone.46  The editor, 
Erwin Knoll, argued that “this country’s security does not lie in an 
oppressive and ineffective system of secrecy and classification but in 
open, honest, and informed public debate about issues which the 
people must decide.”47  The judge was not convinced that all of the 
information was available to the public.48  Nor did he agree with their 
arguments.49 
The judge thought the government met its high standard of proof 
in this case.  The government admitted that at least some of the 
information on the H-bomb contained in the article was in the public 
domain.  But even though the material was in the public domain, the 
government said, “national security” permitted barring its publication 
because “when drawn together,” when “synthesized,” the information 
presents “immediate, direct and irreparable harm to the interests of 
the United States.”50 
The judge did not make his decision lightly.  He said, “A mistake 
in ruling against The Progressive will . . . curtail defendant’s First 
Amendment rights in a drastic and substantial fashion,” but, “a 
mistake in ruling against the United States could pave the way for 
thermonuclear annihilation for us all.  In that event, our right to life is 
extinguished and the right to publish becomes moot.”51 
45. Id. at 991.
46. Id. at 995.
47. Id. at 995–96.
48. Id. at 995.
49. The judge said that this case was different than the Pentagon Papers case.  First,
the Pentagon Papers had contained only “historical data.”  That was not the case with the 
H-bomb article.  Second, in the Pentagon Papers case, the government had not proved
that publication would affect national security.  Id. at 994.  On the Pentagon Papers, see
infra note 105 to 119 and accompanying text.
50. 467 F. Supp. at 991.  The judge said that “the danger lies in the exposition of
certain concepts never heretofore disclosed in conjunction with one another.” Id. at 993. 
No, the article did not “provide a ‘do-it-yourself’ guide for the hydrogen bomb,” the judge 
said, but he thought the information it contained might help a “medium size nation” 
develop an H-bomb more quickly.  Id.  In short, “The Morland piece could accelerate the 
membership of a candidate nation in the thermonuclear club.”  The judge pointed out that 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2104, permitted injunctions against anyone 
communicating restricted data with reason to believe it would injure the United States.  Id. 
at 994. 
51. Id. at 996.
42 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [34:1
The judge relied on Near v. Minnesota, using the “troop 
movements” exception to allow prior restraint.52 
He pointed out that times had changed since 1931 when the 
Supreme Court issued Near—that foot soldiers had been replaced by 
machines.  Publishing technical information on the H-bomb was 
analogous to publishing troop movements, the judge concluded.53 
The government had not sought to extinguish the article in its 
entirety but to delete “certain technical information” from the 
article.54  Before any further decisions were handed down in The 
Progressive case, it, in effect, became moot.  A daily newspaper in 
Madison published a letter that included a diagram of the H-bomb 
and a list of its components.  With the information already in print, 
the government dropped its case against The Progressive, and the 
magazine published the article in its November 1979 issue.55 
No charges were ever filed against anyone for the publication of 
the H-bomb information.  Nor did Snepp, Marchetti, or Plame-
Wilson face criminal prosecution for their actions.  The United States 
treats Manning with a great deal more seriousness.  Given the 
massive size and classification of the leaked material, perhaps this 
difference should be expected. 
52. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).  In the 5-4 Near decision, the Court said that protection from
prior restraint was “not absolutely unlimited” but could occur in “exceptional cases.” 
Then the Court listed four “exceptional cases” where prior restraint of publication could 
be acceptable: cases of (1) obstruction of military recruitment; (2) publishing “sailing dates 
of transports of the number and location of troops;” (3) obscenity; and (4) “incitements to 
acts of violence and the overthrow by force of government.” 283 U.S. at 716.  In Nebraska 
Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976), the Court would add a fifth exceptional case: 
prior restraint to protect a criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial. 
53. 467 F. Supp. at 996.
54. Id. at 997.
55. Howard Morland, The H-Bomb Secret: How We Got It, Why We’re Telling It,
PROGRESSIVE (1979), http://www.progressive.org/images/pdf/1179.pdf; see also Erwin 
Knoll, The H-Bomb and the First Amendment, 3 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 705 (1994) 
and Nation: Grievous Harm, TIME, Mar. 19, 1979, available at http://www.time. 
com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,947008,00.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2011).  PBS included 
the Progressive case in its coverage on Frontline.  National Security v. The Role of the 
Press, PBS http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/newswar/ part1/role.html (last visited 
Mar. 6, 2011) (a rundown of past and ongoing conflicts between the press and the federal 
government over the issue of publishing information that the government believes 
endangers national security).  On arguments for the necessity of national security, see 
generally RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF 
NATIONAL EMERGENCY (2006).  For an interesting article on the origin of the phrase, 
“The Constitution is not a suicide pact,” see David Corn, The “Suicide Pact” Mystery: 
Who Coined the Phrase? Justice Goldberg or Justice Jackson? SLATE (Jan. 4, 2002, 11:04 
AM), http://www.slate.com/id/2060342/. 
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By contrast, Samuel Morison, did face criminal prosecution for 
leaking a small amount of classified data with motives that did not 
engender much sympathy. 
IV. Morison: A Counterpart to Manning with
Big-Friend Support 
Morison did not stand alone in United States v. Morison.56  Beside 
him as amici curiae were: 
The Washington Post; CBS, Inc.; National Broadcasting 
Company, Inc.; Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.; Time, Inc; 
Newsweek; U.S. News & Word Report; The Wall Street 
Journal; The New York Times; The New York Daily News; 
The Los Angeles Times; The Chicago Tribune; The Boston 
Globe; The Atlanta Journal and Constitution; The Miami 
Hearld; The Dallas Morning News; The Minneapolis Star and 
Tribune; Ottaway Newspapers, Inc.; The Associated Press; 
National Public Radio; Pulitzer Broadcasting Company; The 
American Society of Newspaper Editors; The American 
Newspaper Publishers Associations; The American Booksellers 
Association, Inc.; Associated Press Managing Editors; The 
Magazine Publishers Association; The National Association of 
Broadcasters; The Newspaper Guild; The Radio-Television 
News Directors Association; The Reporters Committee for 
Freedom of the Press; The Society of Professional Journalists 
and Public Citizen; Washington Legal Foundation; and The 
Allied Education Foundation.57 
To what heroic lengths did Morison rise to garner such prestigious 
support?  In part, he violated the Espionage Act, giving classified 
information to persons unauthorized to receive it.58  He did not 
56. United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908
(1988). 
57. Id.
58. The Espionage Act covers a broad waterfront of punishable offenses.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 793, titled “Gathering, Transmitting, or Losing Defense Information,” 
Congress targets “[w]hoever, for the purpose of obtaining information respecting the 
national defense with intent or reason to believe that the information is to be used to the 
injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation,” engages in 
prohibited activities involving that national defense information.  Id. § 793(a).  The 
prohibition extends to anyone who “copies, takes, makes, or obtains . . . anything 
connected with the national defense” or who “receives or obtains . . . from any source 
whatever . . . anything connected with the national defense, knowing or having reason to 
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believe, at the time he receives or obtains . . . it, that it has been . . . taken, made, or 
disposed of by any person contrary to the provisions” of the Espionage Act.  Attempts to 
engage in such activities are also prohibited.  Id. § 793(b), (c).  The full-blown language 
lists the national defense information in great detail.  For example, section 793 (b) says: 
“sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, 
appliance, document, writing, or note of anything connected with the national defense.” 
Section 793 also targets any such person who “lawfully having possession of, access to, 
control over, or being entrusted with any . . . information relating to the national defense” 
either “willfully communicates, delivers, transmits or causes to be communicated, 
delivered, or transmitted” the information “to any person not entitled to receive it, or 
willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it on demand to the officer or employee of 
the United States entitled to receive it.” Id. § 793(d).  The same prohibition on 
transmitting or withholding information also applies to persons with “unauthorized 
possession of, access to, or control over . . . information relating to the national defense 
which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the 
United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation.”  Id. § 793(e).  Again, attempts 
are also unlawful.  Id. § 793(e), (d).  In short, copying or obtaining national defense 
material, or attempting to do so, may pose a problem.   Whether a person lawfully or 
unlawfully possessed that national defense information, giving or trying to give that 
national defense material to a person who is unauthorized to receive it, or withholding it 
or trying to withhold it from someone who is authorized to receive it, may violate the 
Espionage Act. 
“Gross negligence” by anyone “entrusted with” handling national defense information 
also violates the law if the information is “removed from its proper place of custody or 
delivered to anyone in violation of his trust” or if it is “lost, stolen, abstracted, or 
destroyed.”  Failure promptly to report such misplacement, loss, or destruction also is 
prohibited.  Id. § 793(f).  This law authorizes fines and/or imprisonment of up to ten years. 
Id.  Forfeiture of “any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person 
obtained, directly or indirectly, from any foreign government” is mandated by this law, 
which says that persons convicted under it “shall forfeit.”  Id. § 793(h)(1).  Under section 
794, titled “Gathering or Delivering Defense Information to Aid Foreign Government,” 
the stakes are much higher for violators, namely, death.  The law says, in part: 
Whoever, with intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the 
injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation, 
communicates, delivers, or transmits, or attempts to communicate, 
deliver, or transmit, to any foreign government, . . . information relating 
to the national defense, shall be punished by death or by imprisonment 
for any term of years or for life. 
18 U.S.C. § 794(a).  However, the law says that death will only be imposed if the trier of 
fact determines that “the offense resulted in the identification by a foreign power . . . of an 
individual acting as an agent of the United States and consequently in the death of that 
individual” or if the offense “directly concerned nuclear weaponry, military spacecraft or 
satellites, early warning systems, or other means of defense or retaliation against large-
scale attack; war plans; communications intelligence or cryptographic information; or any 
other major weapons system or major element of defense strategy.”  Id.  Section 794(b) 
uses the word “publishes”:  
Whoever, in time of war, with intent that the same shall be 
communicated to the enemy, collects, records, publishes, or 
communicates . . . information relating to the public defense, which 
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might be useful to the enemy, shall be punished by death or by 
imprisonment for any term of years or for life.  
18 U.S.C. § 794(b) (2006).  The full-blown language of this section clearly targets troop-
movement material.  It speaks of publication or communication of “the movement, 
numbers, description, condition, or disposition of any of the Armed Forces, ships, aircraft, 
or war materials of the United States.”  Section 794(d) also provides for mandatory 
forfeiture.  While 794(b) uses the word “publishes,” section 793 uses the terms 
“communicates, delivers, transmits.”  In the Pentagon Papers case, Justice Douglas wrote 
that Section 793 is not applicable to the press.  Justice Douglas said, “The Government 
suggests that the word ‘communicates’ is broad enough to encompass publication.”  But he 
points out that three of the sections of the Espionage Act (sections 794, 797 and 798) do 
include the word “publishes.”  New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 720–21 
(1971) (Douglas J., concurring, joined by Black, J.).  Section 795, titled “Photographing 
and sketching defense installations,” prohibits “in the interests of national defense” the 
photographing or making of other visual representations of what the President defines as 
“vital military and naval installations or equipment.” Violation of this provision only 
results in a fine or imprisonment of up to a year, or both.  18 U.S.C. § 795(a)–(b) (2006).  
Section 796 prohibits using aircraft to photograph to make other visual representations of 
vital installations or equipment, again with a possible fine, imprisonment of up to one 
year, or both.  18 U.S.C. § 796 (2006).  Section 797 bears the title “Publication and sale of 
photographs of defense installation.”  Using the term “publication,” as section 794 also 
does, clearly puts the press on notice about violating the Espionage Act.  Section 797 
requires permission from a “commanding officer” prior to publication of photographs or 
other visual representation of vital installation, or a fine or imprisonment up to a year, or 
both.  18 U.S.C. § 797 (2006).  Section 798, titled “Disclosure of classified information,” 
applies to “Whoever knowingly and willfully communicates, furnishes, transmits, or 
otherwise makes available to an unauthorized person, or publishes, or uses in any manner 
prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign 
government to the detriment of the United States any classified information.” 18 U.S.C. § 
798(a) (2006).  Note that this section applies both to communication and to publication of 
classified information.  As for a general definition of “classified information,” it means 
“information which, at the time of a violation of this section, is, for reasons of national 
security, specifically designated by a United States Government Agency for limited or 
restricted dissemination or distribution.”  18 U.S.C. § 798(b) (2006).  Classified 
information includes “any code, cipher, or cryptographic system of the United States or 
any foreign government” or information about the design of devices used for 
“cryptographic or communication intelligence purposes,” as well as “communication 
intelligence activities of the United States or any foreign government.”  18 U.S.C. § 
798(a)(1)–(3) (2006).  Classified information also includes information “obtained by the 
processes of communication intelligence from the communications of any foreign 
government, knowing the same to have been obtained by such processes.”  Id. § 798(a)(4). 
Committees of the House of Representatives and Senate may lawfully demand and 
receive classified information.  “Nothing in this section shall prohibit the furnishing, upon 
lawful demand, of information to any regularly constituted committee of the Senate or 
House of Representatives of the United States of America, or joint committee thereof.” 
18 U.S.C. § 798(c) (2006).  Violation of Section 798 can result in a fine, imprisonment of 
up to ten years, or both.  18 U.S.C. § 798(a) (2006).  This section also mandates forfeiture.  
18 U.S.C. § 798(d) (2006).  On February 10, 2011, Sen. John Ensign, (R-Nev.) introduced 
bill S. 315 to amend § 798.  Senators Scott P. Brown, (R-Mass.), and Joseph I. Lieberman, 
(D-Conn.) co-sponsored the bill.  Called “Securing Human Intelligence and Enforcing 
Lawful Dissemination Act,” or the “Shield Act,” the amendment’s purpose is “to provide 
penalties for disclosure of classified information related to certain intelligence activities of 
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necessarily ride a white horse.  Morison wanted a job, and he was 
willing to break the law, and point the finger at his associates, in order 
to get it. 
More precisely, the District Court of Maryland convicted Morison 
for theft under 18 U.S.C. § 641 and for violating  sections of espionage 
law, 18 U.S.C. §§ 793 (d) and (e)—one from the Espionage Act of 
1917, which made it unlawful to transmit secret information to 
persons who were unauthorized to receive it, and the other from a 
1950 addition to the espionage law that made it unlawful to retain 
secret information and not give it to persons who were entitled to 
receive it.59 
Working at the Naval Intelligence Support Center as an analyst, 
Morison had top secret clearance, and the area in which he worked 
was closed to everyone but people with top secret clearance.  He 
agreed not to disclose information and said he understood that 
unauthorized disclosures could be a violation of U.S. criminal law. 
While off duty, he also worked for Jane’s—a British company that 
publishes information on international military operations.  Although 
the Navy had approved Morison to work for Jane’s, the Navy now 
wanted him to stop, but Morison wanted to work full time for Jane’s.60 
Morison started corresponding with Jane’s editor-in-chief and 
sending him information.  What got him in trouble was that he saw, 
sitting on a desk at his Navy workplace, pictures taken by an 
American reconnaissance satellite of a Soviet aircraft carrier with 
“Secret” and “Warning Notice: Intelligence Sources or Methods 
Involved” stamped on their borders.  He cut off the borders and sent 
the pictures to Jane’s, which published the pictures and made them 
available to other news agencies.  The Washington Post published one 
such picture, and Navy officers saw it.61 
the United States.”  See, e.g., Sen. Ensign Introduces Securing Human Intelligence and 
Enforcing Lawful Dissemination Act, U.S. FED. NEWS, Mar. 4, 2011 (containing a 
complete copy of the proposed legislation).  For commentary on the Espionage Act and 
proposed Shield Act, see Jamie L. Hester, The Espionage Act and Today’s ‘High-Tech 
Terrorist,’ 12 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 177 (June 2011).  For more on SHIELD Act 
language, see infra note 209. 
59. Morison, 844 F.2d at 1060, 1065 n.9. W. Cory Reiss opines, “Justices Black and
Douglas argued in the Pentagon Papers case that § 793 ‘does not apply to the press.’ Who 
may be prosecuted under the Espionage Act for leaked classified material is therefore 
unsettled territory.” W. Cory Reiss, Comment, Crime that Plays: Shaping a Reporter’s 
Shield to Cover National Security in an Insecure World, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 641, 663 
(2009). 
60. Morison, 844 F.2d at 1060.
61. Id. at 1060–61.
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In the ensuing investigation of the theft, Morison denied any 
knowledge of the theft and even told investigators that they should 
investigate two of his fellow employees.  Investigators gathered 
incriminating evidence, including a fingerprint from one of the photos 
that had been sent to Jane’s.  The fingerprint matched Morison’s.62 
Morison was convicted of theft and violation of espionage law. 
On appeal, he argued that espionage law should only apply to “classic 
spying and espionage activity”—giving secret information to agents of 
foreign governments.  Although the statute was clear, Morison 
wanted to argue legislative history.  The court pointed out that 
another section of the Espionage Act, section 764, makes giving 
information to foreign agents unlawful, and it carries the death 
penalty or up to life in prison.  The two sections of the law under 
which Morison was convicted carried much lesser maximum penalties 
of a $ 10,000 fine or 10 years in prison or both.63 
Morison also raised a First Amendment defense—that unless 
there was an exemption for “leaks to the press,” the Espionage Act 
violated the First Amendment.  The court dismissed this argument. 
This was not a prior restraint case, the court said.  Further, the First 
Amendment does not confer a license on reporters or their news 
sources to violate valid criminal laws.64 
Arguably, Morison was not a terribly sympathetic defendant.  He 
had personal motives for the actions that led to his conviction.  On 
the other hand, what was troubling about this case for journalists was 
the implications of gaining access to something marked “Top Secret” 
that contained information that the journalist did not think should be 
62. Id. at 1061–62.
63. Id. at 1063–67.
64. Id. at 1068–69.  The court also cited Snepp, Marchetti, and the H-bomb cases, as
well as Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).  Id. at 1068, 70.  For coverage of 
Branzburg, see infra note 94 to 103 and accompanying text.  The Fourth Circuit cites to 
this article: Edgar & Schmidt, Curtiss-Wright Comes Home: Executive Power and National 
Security Secrecy, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 349, 396–407 (1986), for discussion of 
Morison.  844 F.2d at 1066. 
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classified and also vital for the American public to know.65  Morison 
received a presidential pardon from then-President Bill Clinton.66 
V. Pearson v. Dodd and Bartnicki v. Vopper
An interesting case that the Fourth Circuit thought inapplicable 
to Morison’s situation is Pearson v. Dodd.67  The Morison court said, 
“The defendant’s reference to Pearson v. Dodd . . . is misplaced” 
because Pearson involved “copying.”  As the court pointed out, 
“[Morison’s] case does not involve copying; this case involves the 
65. Government leakers such as Morison do not garner a great deal of support
among commentators.  For example, Keith Werhan has written: “The pre-9/11 
jurisprudence largely denying First Amendment protection to government leakers is 
sound.  In general, the government’s interest in preserving the secrecy of properly 
classified information, the disclosure of which potentially harms the United States, 
outweighs the First Amendment interest of a government employee in leaking such 
information for press publication.”  Keith Werhan, Rethinking Freedom of the Press After 
9/11, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1561, 1597 (2008). 
66. The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press reported on January 23,
2001: 
The first person convicted under espionage statutes for leaking 
information to the press received a presidential pardon more than 16 
years after his arrest.  On his last morning in office, former President Bill 
Clinton pardoned Samuel Loring Morison, a former Navy intelligence 
analyst who was found guilty of providing a British magazine with three 
classified satellite photographs.  Two months before the Jan. 20 pardon, 
Clinton vetoed a bill similar to the law that led to Morison’s conviction.  
A provision in the intelligence authorization bill would have permitted 
the government to pursue felony charges against leakers of classified 
government information, even if the information does not threaten 
national security. 
Morison, grandson of naval historian Samuel Eliot Morison, served two years in prison.  
Clinton Pardons Convicted Analyst Who Gave Spy Photos to Media, REPORTERS COMM. 
FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (Jan. 23, 2001), http://www.rcfp.org 
/newsitems/index.php?i=2659.  The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press was 
one of the amici curiae in Morison’s case.  844 F.2d at 1057.  For commentary on Ellsberg 
and Morison, see Anthony R. Klein, Comment, National Security Information: Its Proper 
Role and Scope in a Representative Democracy , 42 FED. COMM. L.J. 433 (1990).  For more 
general commentary on the Espionage Act, see Robert D. Epstein, Comment, Balancing 
National Security and Free-Speech Rights: Why Congress Should Revise the Espionage Act, 
15 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 483 (2007); Mitchell J. Michalec, Note, The Classified 
Information Protection Act: Killing the Messenger or Killing the Message?, 50 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 455 (2002/2003) (discussing the Espionage Act and other provisions restricting 
information); Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., The Espionage Statutes and 
Publication of Defense Information, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 929 (1973) (discussing the 
legislative histories of the Espionage Act of 1917 and its predecessor statute, the Defense 
Secrets Act of 1911).  See also Hester supra note 58. 
67. 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, sub nom. Dodd v. Pearson, 395 U.S.
947 (1969). 
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actual theft and deprivation of the government of its own tangible 
property.”68 
Perhaps Pearson v. Dodd has some application in the WikiLeaks 
situation.  Bradley Manning engaged in copying.  Julian Assange 
engaged in copying.  Furthermore, The New York Times, The 
Guardian, and other newspapers that received the WikiLeaks 
documents arguably had “clean hands,” receiving the information 
without being complicit in its procurement.69 
As for the facts in Pearson v. Dodd, columnists Drew Pearson and 
Jack Anderson published information about the “alleged misdeeds” 
of Connecticut Senator Thomas Dodd.  The columnists obtained the 
information from staff members and former employees of the senator 
who photocopied some of the senator’s documents from his files. 
They gave the columnists the copies but returned the original 
documents to Dodd’s file cabinets.70 
68. Morison, 844 F.2d at 1077 (citation omitted).
69. Whether Julian Assange himself conspired with Bradley Manning is still a matter
of some contention. Unnamed “military officials” told MSNBC in January 2011 that an 
investigation had revealed no “direct connection” between Assange and Manning, and no 
evidence that the two had any “direct contact.”  See Jim Miklaszewski, NBC: U.S. Can’t 
Link Accused Army Private to Assange, MSNBC, Jan. 24, 2011, http://www.msnbc. 
msn.com/id/41241414/ns/us_news-wikileaks_in_security/.  If Assange did not conspire with 
Manning, then neither he, nor the newspapers can be guilty of theft or of conversion. 
70. In a related case, in 1973, Les Whitten, who worked for Jack Anderson, became
involved in a controversy.  Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. Am. Telephone & 
Telegraph, 593 F.2d 1030, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1978), presented this summary of the Whitten 
case: 
In November 1972 several hundred American Indians occupied the U.S. 
Bureau of Indian Affairs building.  The Washington, D.C., Metropolitan 
Police Department, Intelligence Section, had an undercover agent inside 
the building among the Indians.  When the Indians eventually vacated 
the building, they purloined and took with them Government property, 
including official Government documents.  The undercover agent 
reported to his Section that the Indians had negotiated with Jack 
Anderson, a journalist, for the purchase of some of these stolen 
documents and that an Anderson employee was scheduled to receive the 
documents at the home of one of the Indian leaders.  This information 
was passed on to the FBI.  The Indian leader’s apartment building was 
placed under physical surveillance.  At the scheduled time, Mr. Les 
Whitten, an Anderson employee, arrived at the apartment and was 
subsequently arrested there in apparent possession of the stolen 
documents.  Mr. Anderson’s and Mr. Whitten’s toll-call records were 
subpoenaed to obtain further evidence in the case. 
Whitten did not go to jail.  See Mark Feldstein, The Jailing of a Journalist: Prosecuting the 
Press for Receiving Stolen Documents, 10 COMM. L. & POL’Y 137, 139 (2005) (covering 
prosecution of Les Whitten and also the Pearson v. Dodd case passim). 
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The trial court granted Senator Dodd a partial summary judgment 
on his claim of conversion.  On appeal, the District of Columbia 
Circuit Court of Appeals said that the columnists were not liable 
under a theory of conversion.71 
Conversion is “an intentional exercise of dominion or control 
over a chattel which so seriously interferes with the right of another 
to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay the other the 
full value of the chattel.”72  The appellate court pointed out that the 
files were removed, copied, and returned undamaged in the middle of 
the night, and thus Senator Dodd was not deprived of their use. 
Documents, however, have more than their physical value as “they 
may embody information or ideas whose economic value depends in 
part or in whole upon being kept secret.”73  “The question here is not 
whether [Dodd] had a right to keep his files from prying eyes, but 
whether the information taken from those files falls under the 
protection of the law of property, enforceable by a suit for 
conversion.  In our view, it does not.”74  The court went through a 
laundry list: none of the information could be construed as literary, as 
scientific inventions or as trade secrets.  “Nor does it appear to be 
information held in any way for sale . . . analogous to the fresh news 
copy produced by a wire service.”75 
Although Dodd claimed that the columnists had “aided and 
abetted” in the document’s removal, the appellate court said that “the 
undisputed facts” only established that the columnists “received 
copies of the documents knowing that they had been removed 
Feldstein compares Assange’s publishing of leaked material to that of Jack Anderson:  
“The parallels between Anderson and Assange are striking,” he says.  “Both cultivated 
low-level but well-placed whisleblowers to leak documents revealing corruption and deceit 
by governments and corporations.”  Mark Feldstein, Spreading Leaks Before WikiLeaks, 
AMER. JOURNALISM REV., Sept. 2010, available at http://www.ajr.org/Article.asp? 
id=4958. 
71. Pearson, 410 F.2d at 703.  The trial court did not grant Dodd partial summary
judgment for invasion of privacy.  The appellate court said: “It has always been considered 
a defense to a claim of invasion of privacy by publication . . . that the published matter 
complained of is of general public interest.” The columnists wrote about the senator’s 
relationship to some lobbyists for “foreign interests” and also presented “an interpretive 
biographical sketch of [Dodd’s] public career.” The columns dealt with Dodd’s 
qualifications to serve as a U.S. Senator and thus “amounted to a paradigm example of 
published speech not subject to suit for invasion of privacy.”  Id. 
72. Id. at 706–07 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A(1) (1965)).  If
the interference is less severe than conversion, then the tort is “trespass to chattels.”  Id. at 
707. 
73. Id. at 707.
74. Id. at 708.
75. Id.
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without authorization,” and then published excerpts of those 
documents.76 This rationale would seem to apply to Assange if his 
hands are clean, and also to the newspapers that received information 
from him. 
The bottom line is that the columnists were spared any liability 
for transmitting the information given to them, and the U.S. Supreme 
Court let this decision stand. 
Likewise, in Bartnicki v. Vopper, the U.S. Supreme Court came to 
the aid of journalists by ruling against liability for broadcasting 
illegally recorded phone conversations.77  The Court struck down a 
journalist-unfriendly portion of the federal wiretap law as applied to 
the journalist. 
Federal wiretap law says that anyone who “willfully intercepts . . . 
any wire, electronic, or oral communication” has violated the law.78  
The law goes further: 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c) states that it is a crime if 
anyone “intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other 
person the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, 
knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained 
through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic 
communication.”  The Supreme Court in Bartnicki struck down this 
portion of the wiretap law as a violation of the First Amendment 
under the circumstances.79 
In Bartnicki,  the Pennsylvania State Education Association, a 
union, represented teachers in collective bargaining negotiations with 
the local school board.  The media, of course,  covered the 
contentious negotiations.  The union’s chief negotiator, Bartnicki, 
used the cell phone in her car to call the president of the union to 
discuss the negotiations.  An unidentified person taped the call and 
gave a copy to Vopper, a radio commentator critical of the union. 
The tape included the president of the union saying, “If they’re not 
gonna move for three percent, we’re gonna have to . . . blow off their 
front porches, we’ll have to do some work on some of those guys.” 
76. Id. at 705.
77. 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
78. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2006) et seq., quoted in Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 521 n.3.
79. The only question before it, the Court said, was whether applying the law under
circumstances—intentional, unlawful interception, “disclosure of the contents of the 
intercepted conversation to . . . representatives of the media, as well as the subsequent 
disclosures by the media defendants to the public” by one who at least had reason to know 
of the unlawful nature of the interception—would violate the First Amendment.  532 U.S. 
at 525. 
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Vopper aired the tape,80 violating § 2511(1)(c).  Although Vopper did 
not participate in the illegal taping, he knew or “had reason to know” 
that the phone call was illegally intercepted.81 
In striking down the portion of the wiretap law in question as it 
related to Vopper, the Court said that the interception law’s “naked 
prohibition against disclosures is fairly characterized as a regulation 
of pure speech.” The Court quoted language from the 1979 case of 
Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.,82 saying that “state action to 
punish the publication of truthful information seldom can satisfy 
constitutional standards.”83  The Court also cited the 1971 Pentagon 
Papers case,84 stating “the Court upheld the right of the press to 
publish information of great public concern obtained from documents 
stolen by a third party.” The Court continued, explaining: 
the attention of every Member of this Court was focused on 
the character of the stolen documents’ contents and the 
consequences of public disclosure.  Although the undisputed 
fact that the newspaper intended to publish information 
obtained from stolen documents was noted in Justice Harlan’s 
dissent . . . neither the majority nor the dissenters placed any 
weight on that fact.85 
The Court made clear, however, that the Pentagon Papers case 
“did not resolve the question whether, in cases where information has 
been acquired unlawfully by a newspaper or by a source, government 
may ever punish not only the unlawful acquisition, but the ensuing 
publication as well.”86  That question, the Court said, is still open. 
That question of whether government may punish the publication 
of unlawfully acquired information may well prove to be the 
WikiLeaks question.  Given the Court’s position that “state officials 
80. Id. at 518–19.
81. Id. at 517–18, 525.
82. Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (prohibiting punishment of a
newspaper for publication of the name, lawfully obtained, of a juvenile arrested for 
allegedly killing a person). 
83. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 527 (quoting Smith, 443 U.S. at 102).  The Court went on to
say  “this Court has repeatedly held that if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful 
information about a matter of public significance then state officials may not 
constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need . . . of the highest 
order.” Id. at 527–28 (citations omitted). 
84. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), covered infra in notes
106 to 120 and accompanying text. 
85. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 528.
86. Id. (emphasis added).
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may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent 
a need . . . of the highest order,”87 an answer to whether the 
government may punish the publication of unlawfully acquired 
information would raise the question of whether the government 
could show a need of the highest order in the WikiLeaks case. 
Arguing “national security” as a need of the highest order would 
seem an obvious route for the government, or “secrecy of 
information,” as in Snepp.88 
The Court characterized the question in Bartnicki as: “Where the 
punished publisher of information has obtained the information in 
question in a manner lawful in itself but from a source who has 
obtained it unlawfully, may the government punish the ensuing 
publication of that information based on the defect in a chain?”89 The 
Court answered in the negative and struck down  § 2511(1)(c) as it 
applied to the facts in this case on First Amendment grounds.90 
In part, the Court reasoned that unlawful conduct is usually 
deterred by appropriately punishing the person who broke the law.  If 
the interception law in question had insufficient sanctions to deter 
illegal conduct, then, the Court suggested, maybe the sanctions should 
be increased.  “But it would be quite remarkable to hold that speech 
by a law-abiding possessor of information can be suppressed in order 
to deter conduct by a non-law-abiding third party.”91 
The Court said that it was balancing the interests between 
“privacy of communication” and the First Amendment, and made 
clear that its decision in this case did not apply to publication of 
87. Id. at 527–28 (citing Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989), where the Court
denied punishment of a newspaper under a statute forbidding instruments of mass 
communication to name rape victims, and Landmark Communications v. Virginia, 435 
U.S. 829 (1978), where the Court denied punishment of a newspaper for publishing 
truthful information about a confidential proceeding involving the conduct of a judge). 
88. Would keeping “state secrets” qualify as a governmental interest of the highest
order? “Secrecy of information” is a “compelling interest,” the Court says in Snepp v. 
United States, 444 U.S. 507, 510 (1998).  One commentator says, “The classic example of 
such [‘highest order’] information from Supreme Court dicta is the sailing date of a troop 
ship during a time of war.  Additional examples might well include the identity of 
undercover CIA agents and technical design information for weapons of mass destruction. 
Werhan, supra note 65, at 1561, 1597. Another commentator argues, “Even when the 
national security damage does not outweigh First Amendment considerations in a given 
case, the release of national security information should still only be tolerated when the 
objectives of the First Amendment as a tool of democracy are served.” Reiss, supra note 
65, at 668-69. 
89. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 528.
90. “The constitutional question before us concerns the validity of the statutes as
applied to the specific facts of this case.”  Id. at 524. 
91. Id. at 529–30.
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private matters such as “trade secrets or domestic gossip.” The Court 
explained: “The outcome of the case does not turn on whether § 
2511(1)(c) may be enforced with respect to most violations of the 
statute without offending the First Amendment.  The enforcement of 
that provision in this case, however, implicates the core purposes of 
the First Amendment because it imposes sanctions on the publication 
of truthful information of public concern.”92  Still, the Court 
“reiterated its repeated refusal to answer categorically whether 
truthful publication may ever be punished consistent with the First 
Amendment.”93 
Could the primary question in the WikiLeaks case, then, be 
whether the dissemination of its truthful information is of public 
concern? After all, the Court stated flatly in Bartnicki, “We think it 
clear that . . . a stranger’s illegal conduct does not suffice to remove 
the First Amendment shield from speech about a matter of public 
concern.”94 
VI. Branzburg v. Hayes
In Branzburg v. Hayes,95 by a narrow 5-4 margin,96 the U.S. 
Supreme Court slammed the door on journalists’ attempts to use the 
First Amendment to protect their confidential sources when 
subpoenaed to appear in front of good-faith grand juries.97  Indeed, 
prior to 1972 and the Branzburg decision, some courts had permitted 
journalists to claim First Amendment protection when ordered to 
reveal their sources before grand juries.98 
92. Id. at 533–34.
93. Id. at 529.
94. Id. at 535.
95. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
96. With Justice Lewis Powell landing in the middle, some commentators even argue
that Branzburg can be viewed as a 4-1-4 decision.  See, e.g., Rodney A. Smolla, Panel 
Discussion, The First Amendment, Journalists, and Sources: A Curious Study in “Reverse 
Federalism,” 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1423, 1426 (2008); David Rudenstine, Panel 
Discussion, A Reporter Keeping Confidences: More Important Than Ever, 29 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1431, 1436 (2008); and C. Edwin Baker, Reclaiming the First Amendment: 
Constitutional Theories of Media Reform: The Independent Significance of the Press Clause 
Under Existing Law, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 955, 984 (2007). 
97. The Court says that “grand jury investigations if instituted or conducted other
than in good faith, would pose wholly different issues for resolution under the First 
Amendment. Official harassment of the press undertaken not for purposes of law 
enforcement but to disrupt a reporter’s relationship with his news sources would have no 
justification.”  Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 707–08. 
98. For example, in Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1970), the Ninth
Circuit granted a First Amendment privilege to journalist Earl Caldwell, who was covering 
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According to the Supreme Court, “The heart of the claim is that 
the burden on news gathering resulting from compelling reporters to 
disclose confidential information outweighs any public interest in 
obtaining the information.”99  The Court rejected this claim, while 
paying at least some homage to the importance of protecting the 
press.100 
Still, the Court seemed to be doing its best to deflate what it 
apparently perceived as journalists’ overstated value of their 
importance.101  Journalists attempted to claim a “privileged position,” 
Black Panther Party activities for The New York Times.  Caldwell had received a 
subpoena to appear in front of a grand jury.  In opposing a motion to quash, the 
government had maintained that an officer in the Black Panther Party had threatened to 
kill then-president Richard Nixon in a televised speech and that three issues of the 
Panther newspaper had repeated that threat.  Id. at 676–77.  After more legal wrangling 
and the expiration of one grand jury and the convening of a new one, Caldwell received a 
contempt citation for refusing to appear in front of the grand jury.  Id. at 667–68.  The 
Ninth Circuit, however, granted Caldwell a limited First Amendment privilege.  In 
Branzburg, the Supreme Court gave the following account of the Ninth Circuit’s decision: 
Viewing the issue before it as whether Caldwell was required to appear 
before the grand jury at all, rather than the scope of permissible 
interrogation, the court first determined that the First Amendment 
provided a qualified testimonial privilege to newsmen; in its view, 
requiring a reporter like Caldwell to testify would deter his informants 
from communicating with him in the future and would cause him to 
censor his writings in an effort to avoid being subpoenaed.  Absent 
compelling reasons for requiring his testimony, he was held privileged to 
withhold it.  The court also held, for similar First Amendment reasons, 
that, absent some special showing of necessity by the Government, 
attendance by Caldwell at a secret meeting of the grand jury was 
something he was privileged to refuse because of the potential impact of 
such an appearance on the flow of news to the public. 
408 U.S. at 679. 
99. 408 U.S. at 681.
100. The Court said:
We do not question the significance of free speech, press, or assembly to
the country’s welfare.  Nor is it suggested that news gathering does not
qualify for First Amendment protection; without some protection for
seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.  But
these cases involve no intrusions upon speech or assembly, no prior
restraint or restriction on what the press may publish, and no express or
implied command that the press publish what it prefers to withhold.
Id. 
101. For example, the Court said, “we cannot seriously entertain the notion that the
First Amendment protects a newsman’s agreement to conceal the criminal conduct of his 
source, or evidence thereof, on the theory that it is better to write about crime than to do 
something about it.”  Id. at 692. 
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the Court apparently thought.102  What the high Court did, in effect, 
was to level the playing field between journalists and other citizens in 
front of grand juries: 
The sole issue before us is the obligation of reporters to 
respond to grand jury subpoenas as other citizens do and to 
answer questions relevant to an investigation into the 
commission of crime.  Citizens generally are not 
constitutionally immune from grand jury subpoenas; and 
neither the First Amendment nor any other constitutional 
provision protects the average citizen from disclosing to a 
grand jury information that he has received in confidence.103 
The high Court even invoked Jeremy Bentham on the importance 
of everyone’s availability to testify in front of grand juries, including 
royalty subpoenaed to testify about a case involving paupers,104 and 
Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinion that the President of the United 
States could be subpoenaed if the circumstances were right.105 
In short, the Court was emphatic that “the Constitution does not, 
as it never has, exempt the newsman from performing the citizen’s 
normal duty of appearing and furnishing information relevant to the 
grand jury’s task.”106 
102. Speaking of the obligation to testify in front of grand juries, the Court said:
The claim is . . . that reporters are exempt from these obligations because
if forced to respond to subpoenas and identify their sources or disclose
other confidences, their informants will refuse or be reluctant to furnish
newsworthy information in the future.  This asserted burden on news
gathering is said to make compelled testimony from newsmen
constitutionally suspect and to require a privileged position for them.
 Id. at 682. 
103. Id.
104.
Were the Prince of Wales, the Archbishop of Canterbury, and the Lord 
High Chancellor, to be passing by in the same coach, while a chimney-
sweeper and a barrow-woman were in dispute about a halfpennyworth of 
apples, and the chimney-sweeper or the barrow-woman were to think 
proper to call upon them for their evidence, could they refuse it? No, 
most certainly. 
Id. at 688, n.26 (quoting 4 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 320–21 (J. Bowring ed. 
1843). 
105. 408 U.S. at 688, citing United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 34 (No. 14,692d) (CC
Va. 1807). 
106. 408 U.S. at 691.
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Justice Stewart decried the Court’s “crabbed view of the First 
Amendment.”107 
In the wake of Branzburg, journalists could no longer claim any 
privilege in front of grand juries other than the privilege belonging to 
everyone, namely, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.108  However, the Court did say that legislators could 
fashion privileges for journalists, if the legislators wished. 
Perhaps the Court was primarily showing its practical bent: If the 
Court granted a journalist109 privilege, then the Court would 
necessarily have to define who fell into the classification of 
“journalist” and could thus claim the privilege.110  Defining who falls 
into that category is difficult and is arguably becoming even more 
difficult in the age of the Internet where bloggers abound.111 
The Branzburg majority expressed the viewpoint that everyone, 
journalists included, must obey valid criminal laws.  In the Court’s 
words: “It is clear that the First Amendment does not invalidate every 
incidental burdening of the press that may result from the 
enforcement of civil or criminal statutes of general applicability.”112  
Nor does the First Amendment grant to the press “a constitutional 
107. Id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 689–90.
109. The Court used the sexist term “newsmen”—for example, in the very first
sentence of the opinion:  “The issue in these cases is whether requiring newsmen to appear 
and testify before state or federal grand juries abridges the freedom of speech and press 
guaranteed by the First Amendment.” Id. 
 110. 
The administration of a constitutional newsman’s privilege would present 
practical and conceptual difficulties of a high order.  Sooner or later, it 
would be necessary to define those categories of newsmen who qualified 
for the privilege, a questionable procedure in light of the traditional 
doctrine that liberty of the press is the right of the lonely pamphleteer 
who uses carbon paper or a mimeograph just as much as of the large 
metropolitan publisher who utilizes the latest photocomposition 
methods. 
Id. at 703–04. 
111. The supposed lines delineating journalists blurs further given that social media
allow its users to quickly and easily commit “random acts of journalism.” Twitter users 
were among the first to post pictures of the 2009 US Airways flight that landed safely in 
the Hudson River.  More recently, a Twitter user in Abbottabad, Pakistan, unknowingly 
posted live updates of the U.S. Special Forces raid that killed Osama bin Laden.  See 
Matthew Ingram, Does Posting Things to Twitter Make You a Journalist?, GIGAOM (May 
5, 2011, 4:04 PM), http://gigaom.com/2011/05/05/does-posting-things-to-twitter-make-you-
a-journalist/. 
112. 408 U.S. at 682.
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right of special access to information not available to the public 
generally.”113 
The Branzburg Court even addresses the issue of stealing 
documents: 
Although stealing documents or private wiretapping could 
provide newsworthy information, neither reporter nor source 
is immune from conviction for such conduct, whatever the 
impact on the flow of news.  Neither is immune, on First 
Amendment grounds, from testifying against the other, before 
the grand jury or at a criminal trial.  The Amendment does 
not reach so far as to override the interest of the public in 
ensuring that neither reporter nor source is invading the rights 
of other citizens through reprehensible conduct forbidden to 
all other persons.114 
The Court thus made its viewpoint clear: First Amendment 
arguments wither when confronted with valid laws of “general 
applicability.” 
VII. The Danger of Applying Branzburg’s Logic to Bartnicki
and New York Times v. United States 
What if the Court in Bartnicki had followed the doctrine that 
journalists must follow rules of general applicability, namely, that it is 
a crime to receive stolen property?  In other words, what if the Court 
in Bartnicki had applied Branzburg-type logic? 
Under a Branzburg-type analysis, Vopper’s actions would fall 
under the ambit of the generally applicable rule that receiving stolen 
property is a crime and, therefore, Vopper’s receipt of the tape would 
be a criminal act and punishable. 
Further, the Pentagon Papers case would have to be decided 
differently using Branzburg’s logic.  The Bartnicki Court character-
ized the Pentagon Papers case as upholding “the right of the press to 
publish information of great public concern obtained from documents 
stolen by a third party.”115 
The Pentagon Papers case started in early 1971 when a reporter 
from The New York Times received a photocopy of the secret 47-
volume study of the history of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the 
113. Id. at 684.
114. Id. at 692.
115. Id. at 528 (emphasis added).
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so-called Pentagon Papers.116  This study was prepared by the Defense 
Department, which had not planned for the papers to be made 
public.117 
But Dr. Daniel Ellsberg, a former Pentagon employee and one of 
the study’s thirty-six authors,118 had turned against the war.  He 
slipped a copy of the Pentagon Papers to a New York Times 
reporter.119  A team of reporters worked for three months.  Then, on 
116. According to Circuit Judge MacKinnon on June 23, 1971, “Our ability to deal
effectively with the problem is also currently complicated today by the release of the 
entire 47 volumes to Congress where the problem of disclosure may be compounded.” 
United States v. Wash. Post Co., 446 F.2d 1327, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1971).  According to 
Justice Burger, “[T]he Times conducted its analysis of the 47 volumes of Government 
documents over a period of several months and did so with a degree of security that a 
government might envy.” N. Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 749 n.1 (1971) 
(Burger, J., dissenting).  But Floyd Abrams says Ellsberg made 43 volumes available: 
In 1971, Daniel Ellsberg decided to make available to the New York 
Times (and then to other newspapers) 43 volumes of the Pentagon 
Papers, the top-secret study prepared for the Department of Defense 
examining how and why the United States had become embroiled in the 
Vietnam conflict.  But he made another critical decision as well.  That 
was to keep confidential the remaining four volumes of the study 
describing the diplomatic efforts of the United States to resolve the war. 
Not at all coincidentally, those were the volumes that the government 
most feared would be disclosed. 
Floyd Abrams, Why WikiLeaks is Unlike the Pentagon Papers, WALL STREET JOURNAL, 
Dec. 29, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020452780457604402039660 
1528.html. 
117. The National Archives released an official, declassified version of the Pentagon
Papers in June 2011.  It is almost a complete version of the original report: Eleven words 
remain redacted.  See A.J. Daverede, The Real Pentagon Papers, NAT’L 
DECLASSIFICATION CTR (NDC) BLOG (May 26, 2011), http://blogs.archives.gov/ 
ndc/?p=138. 
118. Leslie H. Gelb, The Way Out of Afghanistan, DAILY BEAST, (Aug. 1, 2010, 6:58
PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2010/08/01/gelb-pentagon-papers-and-wikileaks. 
html. 
119. Comparing the ease of Manning’s transfer of information to Julian Assange in
2010 with the difficulty of Daniel Ellsberg’s copying and smuggling 47 volumes of hard-
copy Pentagon Papers to a New York Times reporter in 1971 makes clear how easy 
technology has made the transmission of massive amounts of information.  So does 
comparing the ease with which Julian Assange made information available to the whole 
world to the relatively limited transmission of chunks of Pentagon Papers information to 
readers of The New York Times, Washington Post, and other newspapers.  The age of the 
Internet is clearly a new age for information acquisition and transmission.  The 
transformation is perhaps like that from conventional warfare to the atomic age, with 
massive fallout on a global scale: the information “bomb” goes off and radiates worldwide 
almost instantaneously.  WikiLeaks’ “leaks became a torrent,” Scott Shane says.  He 
states: 
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Traditional watchdog journalism, which has long accepted leaked 
information in dribs and drabs, has been joined by a new counterculture 
of information vigilantism that now promises disclosures by the terabyte. 
A bureaucrat can hide a library’s worth of documents on a key fob, and 
scatter them over the Internet to a dozen countries during a cigarette 
break. 
Scott Shane, Keeping Secrets WikiSafe, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2010 at WK1.  In response, 
he says, the Defense Department is cutting back on sharing information, stripping 
computers of their CD and DVD recorders, requiring two people instead of just one for 
huge downloads of information from a classified to an unclassified computer, and 
installing software that can detect unusually large downloads.  Id. The Internet also briefly 
buzzed at claims that Daniel Ellsberg calls Julian Assange his “reincarnation.” See, e.g., 
Webster G. Tarpley, Wikileaks Is The “Cognitive Infiltration” Operation Demanded by 
Cass Sunstein, DPROGRAM.NET (Jan. 22, 2010), http://dprogram.net/2011/01/22/wikileaks-
is-the-%E2%80%9Ccognitive-infiltration%E2%80%9D-operation-demanded-by-cass-sun 
stein-webster-g-tarpley/. 
A California court of appeals in 2006 put a positive spin on digital communication and 
how availability of source material will reduce editorial spin: 
Digital communication and storage, especially when coupled with 
hypertext linking, make it possible to present readers with an unlimited 
amount of information in connection with a given subject, story, or 
report.  The only real constraint now is time—the publisher’s and the 
reader’s . . . Courts ought not to cling too fiercely to traditional 
preconceptions, especially when they may operate to discourage the 
seemingly salutary practice of providing readers with source materials 
rather than subjecting them to the editors’ own “spin” on a story. 
O’Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 98 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).  The same would 
seem to apply to source material reducing government’s spin.  For example, on February 
4, 2011, The Daily Telegraph of London reported, “The US secretly agreed to give the 
Russians sensitive information on Britain’s nuclear deterrent to persuade them to sign a 
key treaty, The Daily Telegraph can disclose.”  The source?  U.S. diplomatic communiques 
posted on WikiLeaks.  The Telegraph did not stop with its story but also gave interested 
readers the raw information: “Details of the behind-the-scenes talks are contained in more 
than 1,400 US embassy cables published to date by the Telegraph, including almost 800 
sent from the London Embassy, which are published online today.”  See Matthew Moore, 
Gordon Raynor & Christopher Hope, WikiLeaks cables: US Agrees to Tell Russia Britain’s 
Nuclear Secrets, TELEGRAPH, Feb. 4, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ 
wikileaks/8304654/WikiLeaks-cables-US-agrees-to-tell-Russia-Britains-nuclear-
secrets.html. See also Nile Gardiner, The Obama Administration Betrays Britain to 
Appease the Russians Over New START, TELEGRAPH, Feb. 4, 2011, 
http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/nilegardiner/100074846/the-obama-administration-betrays-
britain-to-appease-the-russians-over-new-start.  The Bangkok Post reported: “For those 
seeking to better understand the events in Egypt, by far the best source of information is 
WikiLeaks.  The huge release of cables from the US embassy in Cairo offer fascinating 
insights and background into the drama unfolding in Tahrir.”  Fascinating and disturbing, 
if one agrees with the position of the Bangkok paper: “[T]he cables show how Arab and 
Islamic leaders have allowed themselves to be made complete fools, why their peoples are 
rising up to say that enough is enough and why that political tsunami will strike many 
shores right across the world.”  See Imtiaz Mugbil, WikiLeaks: Clues to a Failed U.S. 
Policy, BANGKOK POST, Feb. 6, 2011, http:// www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/220085/ 
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June 13, 1971, a Sunday, The New York Times printed on the front 
page its first story based on the Pentagon Papers.120  The New York 
wikileaks-clues-to-a-failed-us-policy.  And WikiLeaks has been given the credit or blame, 
depending on one’s attitude, for the revolutions in the Middle East.  See, e.g, Maha 
Azzam, Opinion: How WikiLeaks helped fuel Tunisian revolution, CNN, Jan. 18, 2011, 
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-01-18/opinion/tunisia.wikileaks _1_tunisians-wikileaks-regime; 
Robert Mackey, Quaddafi Sees WikiLeaks Plot in Tunisia, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2011, 
http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/17/qaddafi-sees-wikileaks-plot-in-tunisia/; Ian 
Black, Tunisia: The WikiLeaks Connection, GUARDIAN, Jan. 15, 2011, http://www. 
guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/15/tunisia-wikileaks-ghannouchi.  Assange himself 
said WikiLeaks was responsible in part for the regime changes in Egypt and Tunisia. See 
Wikileaks’ Julian Assange takes credit for Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, DAILY MAIL 
(Feb. 14, 2011, 3:23 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1356754/Wikileaks-
Julian-Assange-takes-credit-Tunisian-Egyptian-revolutions.html#ixzz1JniuB74Zntstu.  
Even former Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi joined in.  See Matthew Weaver, 
Muammar Gaddafi condemns Tunisia uprising, GUARDIAN UK (Jan. 16, 2011, 1:07 AM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/16/muammar-gaddafi-condemns-tunisia-uprising.  
Abroad, the WikiLeaks flap in part is seen as curious.  While Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton called the diplomatic leaks “not just an attack on America—it’s an attack on the 
international community,” from Paris came this report: “For many Europeans, 
Washington’s fierce reaction to the flood of secret diplomatic cables released by 
WikiLeaks displays imperial arrogance and hypocrisy, indicating a post-9/11 obsession 
with secrecy that contradicts American principles.”  See Scott Neuman, Clinton: 
WikiLeaks ‘Tear at Fabric’ of Government, NPR.ORG, Nov. 29, 2010, http://www.npr.org/ 
2010/11/29/131668950/white-house-aims-to-limit-wikileaks-damage; Steven Erlanger, 
Many Europeans Find U.S. Attacks on WikiLeaks Puzzling, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2010, at 
12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/10/world/europe/10wikileaks-react.html.  
One comment in this article came from the Berliner Zeitung: “The U.S. is betraying one of 
its founding myths: freedom of information. And they are doing so now, because for the 
first time since the end of the cold war, they are threatened with losing worldwide control 
of information.”  On the other hand, a reporter for Le Figaro, Renauti Girard, opined: 
“What is most fascinating is that we see no cynicism in U.S. diplomacy.  They really 
believe in human rights in Africa and China and Russia and Asia.  They really believe in 
democracy and human rights.  People accuse the Americans of double standards all the 
time.  But it’s not true here.  If anything, the diplomats are almost naive, and I don’t think 
these leaks will jeopardize the United States. Most will see the diplomats as honest, 
sincere and not so cynical.”  Id.  But WikiLeaks did leak hundreds of thousands of class-
ified documents concerning U.S. wars.  And Assange has shown himself capable of using 
information offensively, threatening to dump unredacted material if the United States 
attempts to prosecute him and, separately, to release information about major banks.  See, 
e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin, A WikiLeak Problem for Enforcers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2010
at 1, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C06E1D71639F932
A15751C1A9669D8B63; Ian Drury, WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange ‘will release poison
pill of damaging secrets if killed or arrested,’ DAILY MAIL, Dec. 6, 2010,
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1335888/WikiLeaks-Julian-Assange-release-damaging-
secrets-killed-arrested.html.
120. On the top-center of the front page of The New York Times appeared a story
three columns wide by Neil Sheehan titled “Vietnam Archive: Pentagon Study Traces 3 
Decades of Growing U.S. Involvement.”  In a small box at the top of the middle column 
appeared these words: “Three pages of documentary material from the Pentagon study 
begin on Page 35.”  According to Sheehan’s story, the Pentagon Papers are composed of a 
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Times also made Pentagon Papers information available to other 
newspapers.121 
Less than forty-eight hours later, The New York Times received a 
telegram from U.S. Attorney General John Mitchell, saying that any 
more articles based on the Pentagon Papers would bring about 
“irreparable injury to the defense interests of the United States.”122  
Columnist James Reston summed up the situation: “For the first time 
in the history of the Republic, the Attorney General of the United 
States has tried to suppress documents he hasn’t read about a war 
that hasn’t been declared.”123 
The Justice Department asked U.S. District Court Judge Murray 
Gurfein to issue a temporary restraining order against The New York 
Times.  Interestingly, it was Judge Gurfein’s first day on the job as a 
federal judge.124  He granted the temporary restraining order on June 
15, but on June 19, Judge Gurfein refused to give the government a 
preliminary injunction.  He said: 
These are troubled times.  There is no greater safety valve for 
discontent and cynicism about the affairs of Government than 
freedom of expression in any form.  This has been the genius 
of our institutions throughout our history.  It is one of the 
marked traits of our national life that distinguish us from 
other nations under different forms of government.125 
“3,000 page analysis, to which 4,000 pages of official documents are appended,” and 
Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara commissioned the study. 
121. For example, on June 14, the day after The New York Times published its first
story on the Pentagon Papers, the Louisville Courier Journal said: “Dateline: Washington: 
The White House has no copy of the highly secret governmental history of U.S. 
involvement in Vietnam.  Excerpts were published yesterday in The New York Times and 
made available through its news service to newspapers nationwide, including the Courier-
Journal.” 
122. Max Frankel, Court Step Likely, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1971, at 1.
123. The Pentagon Papers:  A Public Domain Reminder:  US Lies and Deception, ASK
WHY!, May 15, 2003, at 20 available at www.askwhy.co.uk/warandpropaganda/ 
pentagonpapers.pdf (last visited June 5, 2011). 
124. See, e.g., Cover Story: Pentagon Papers, The Secret War, CNN, http://
www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1996/analysis/back.time/9606/28/index.shtml; Top Secret: 
The Battle for the Pentagon Papers, www.topsecretplay.org/index.php/content/timeline, 
and The Nation: The Legal Battle Over Censorship, TIME MAGAZINE, June 28, 1971, 
www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,905236,00.html. 
125. United States v. New York Times Co., 328 F. Supp. 324, 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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However, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, 
demanding further hearings and enjoining publication of more 
Pentagon Papers stories by the Times.126 
On June 26, only thirteen days after The New York Times 
published its first story on the Pentagon Papers, the Supreme Court 
heard the case, and the Court reached its decision four days later. 
The Supreme Court issued a three-paragraph-long per curiam 
decision.  All nine justices wrote separate opinions, with three justices 
dissenting.  The bottom line is that the Supreme Court lifted the 
injunction on The New York Times.  The Court said, “Any system of 
prior restraint of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy 
presumption against its constitutional validity.”127  John Mitchell and 
the Department of Justice were not able to meet that heavy burden. 
Justice Douglas wrote a concurring opinion, saying, “The 
dominant purpose of the First Amendment was to prohibit the 
widespread practice of governmental suppression of embarrassing 
information. . . . [A] debate of large proportions goes on in the Nation 
over our posture in Vietnam. Open debate and discussion of public 
issues are vital to our national health.”128  Justice Douglas seems to be 
saying that instead of being a risk to national security, the publishing 
of the Pentagon Papers was “vital” to national security.  He 
acknowledged that “[t]hese disclosures may have a serious impact,” 
126. United States v. New York Times Co., 444 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1970).  On June 18,
the Washington Post got into the act, publishing parts of the Pentagon Papers.  The Justice 
Department got a TRO against the Washington Post, as well, but Judge Gerhard Gesell, 
the district court judge, denied a preliminary injunction.  On June 23, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia heard the United States’ appeal from the district 
court’s denial of a preliminary injunction against the Post.  When the issue came before 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, the Pentagon claimed that 
publication would betray a national security secret.  After Judge David Bazelon called 
attorneys for both sides, and one Post reporter, into his chambers to ask what secret would 
be betrayed.  The Pentagon identified the “secret” as the fact that the American military 
had broken the code of the North Vietnamese navy.  But the reporter, George Wilson, 
reached into his green vinyl bag and located a passage from a Congressional hearing that 
disclosed that the government had already made the alleged secret public during a Senate 
investigation of the 1964 naval incident in the Gulf of Tonkin.  See EDMUND B. LAMBETH, 
COMMITTED JOURNALISM: AN ETHIC FOR THE PROFESSION, 156 (2d ed. 1992).  See also 
United States v. Wash. Post Co., 446 F.2d 1327, 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The court ruled in 
favor of the Post and against an injunction.  Id. at 1328. 
127. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
128. Id. at 723–24, (Douglas J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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but he said “that is no basis for sanctioning a previous restraint on the 
press.”129 
Justice Black in his concurrence extolled the virtues of the 
Founding Fathers, saying that with the First Amendment, they 
provided the needed protection for the press to fill its “essential role” 
in democracy.  He explained that “[t]he press was to serve the 
governed, not the governors.  The Government’s power to censor the 
press was abolished so that the press would remain forever free to 
censure the Government.  The press was protected so that it could bare 
the secrets of government and inform the people.”130 
The duty of the press for Justice Black could be boiled down, 
perhaps, to two words: exposing deception.  He said that “[o]nly a 
free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in 
government.”  But what about exposing deception when national 
security is arguably at issue?  He seems to be saying that if the issue is 
war, then the press must expose deception: “And paramount among 
the responsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent any part of 
the government from deceiving the people and sending them off to 
distant lands to die.”131 
Justice Black could hardly have been more complimentary to the 
newspapers involved in the leak of the Pentagon Papers to the 
American public: 
In my view, far from deserving condemnation for their 
courageous reporting, The New York Times, The Washington 
Post, and other newspapers should be commended for serving 
the purpose that the Founding Fathers saw so clearly.  In 
revealing the workings of government that led to the Vietnam 
war, the newspapers nobly did precisely that which the 
Founders hoped and trusted they would do.132 
Had Branzburg’s reasoning held sway with the Pentagon Papers, 
the Court would have applied the general rule of applicability 
concerning the criminality of receiving stolen property and ruled 
against The New York Times and The Washington Post.  The Court 
129. Id. at 722–23.  Justice Douglas also argued the statutory language in 18 U.S.C. §
793, concluding that no statute existed to bar publication of the Pentagon Papers material. 
Id. at 720–21. 
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would have constricted the free flow of information and changed 
history—much for the worse. 
The Branzburg doctrine of applying rules of general applicability 
(“Thou shalt not receive stolen property”) was mercifully ignored by 
the Court in Bartnicki and the Pentagon Papers case, as it arguably 
should have been in Branzburg.  But would the Branzburg rules-of-
general-applicability doctrine be applied in a WikiLeaks case? 
The government was able to get Daniel Ellsberg and one of his 
cohorts indicted under federal espionage, theft, and conspiracy laws, 
but no conviction ensued.  The trial judge looked at the “totality of 
the circumstances” of the trial and thought that there was improper 
government conduct.  The judge declared a mistrial.133 
On June 13, 2011, forty years to the day after The New York 
Times printed its first story based on the Pentagon Papers, the U.S. 
government released the Pentagon Papers for public consumption.134 
VIII. Franklin, Rosen, and Weissman; Risen and Lichtblau;
Drake and Sterling 
In January 2006, Lawrence Franklin, who worked for the 
Department of Defense, received a 150-month sentence for violating 
the Espionage Act.  He pleaded guilty to two counts.135  Franklin had 
been indicted along with two other Department of Defense officials, 
Steven J. Rosen and Keith Weissman.  Rosen was the Director of 
Foreign Policy Issues at the American Israeli Public Affairs 
Committee (“AIPAC”), while Weissman was the Senior Middle East 
Analyst for AIPAC’s Foreign Policy Issues Department.  Rosen and 
Weissman did not plead guilty. 
In 2009, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals made a ruling in the 
series of cases known as United States v. Rosen.136  The cases began in 
133. SANFORD J. UNGAR, THE PAPERS & THE PAPERS: AN ACCOUNT OF THE
LEGAL AND POLITICAL BATTLE OVER THE PENTAGON PAPERS 242, 274 (1972);  On 
government improprieties as the grounds for the dismissal in the Ellsberg case, see 
Transcribed Remarks of the Honorable Stephen Trott, Perspectives on Watergate Panel: 
Memories of the Ellsberg Break-In, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 765 (2000) (excellent coverage of 
the break-in of Daniel Ellsberg’s psychiatrist’s office and Ellsberg’s release). 
134. See, e.g., Calvin Woodward & Richard Lardner, Pentagon Papers Released 40
Years After New York Times Began Publishing Them, HUFFINGTON POST (June 13, 2011, 
9:18 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/13/pentagon-papers-released-_n_875748. 
html. 
135. United States v. Rosen, 557 F.3d 192, 194 n.1 (4th Cir. 2009).  See also, Scott
Shane & David Johnston, Pro-Israel Lobbying Group Roiled by Prosecution of Two Ex-
Officials, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2006, at 21. 
136. 557 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 2009).
 
66 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [34:1
2006 with a ruling by the Eastern District Court of Virginia that 18 
U.S.C. § 793, as applied to Rosen and Weissman, was not 
unconstitutionally vague.137  A grand jury had indicted Rosen and 
Weissman, along with Franklin, in August 2005 for unlawful 
transmission of national defense information from government 
sources to AIPAC, foreign officials, and news media from 1999 to 
2004. 
Applying the Classified Information Procedures Act,138 the trial 
court made an evidentiary ruling on classified information.139  The 
court concluded that an FBI report was relevant to Rosen and 
Weissman’s defense.  While the defendants wanted to use the whole 
report, the government wanted to redact the report, maintaining that 
portions of it were irrelevant.  According to the appellate court, the 
trial court “proposed redactions in painstaking detail,” agreeing with 
the government that some redactions were necessary but that some 
would impede the defendants’ in preparing their defense.  In so 
ruling, the appellate court said, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion.140  A “classified information privilege,” claimed by the 
government, must yield if the classified information “is relevant and 
helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair 
determination of a cause.”141 
In 2009, the U.S. government dropped charges against Rosen and 
Weissman for conspiring with Franklin to transmit government 
secrets.  The two lobbyists had gained court permission to subpoena 
high-ranking government officials, including then-Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice, to explore the defense allegation that government 
officials frequently pass classified information to foreign 
governments.142 
137. United States v. Rosen, 444 F. Supp. 2d 664 (E.D. Va. 2006).
138. 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1–16.
139. 557 F.3d at 194–95.
140. Id. at 200.
141. Id. at 195 (citations omitted).
142. See Derigan A. Silver, National Security and the Press:  The Government’s Ability
to Prosecute Journalists for the Possession of Publication of National Security Information, 
13 COMM. L. & POL’Y 447 (2008) (covering the prosecution under Attorney General 
Alberto R. Gonzales of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) for 
possession and dissemination of national security information);  Heidi Kitrosser, Classified 
Information Leaks and Free Speech, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 881 (2008); Joe Bant, Comment, 
United States v. Rosen: Pushing the Free Press onto a Slippery Slope? 55 KAN. L. REV. 1027 
(2007); Peter Shapiro, Note, “Prologue to a Farce?”  A Historical Perspective on the AIPAC 
Case and the Applicability of the Espionage Act to Journalists, 6 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y 
& ETHICS J. 237 (2007) (The AIPAC case is the Rosen case).  For coverage of the Franklin 
affair, see William E. Lee, Probing Secrets: The Press and Inchoate Liability for 
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According to Heidi Kitrosser, there is a link between the case 
involving Rosen and Weissman and the later National Security 
Agency leak case involving two New York Times reporters.  She said 
the Rosen and Weissman case reflected “a broader trend toward 
cracking down on classified information leaks” by the Bush 
administration, which maintained that the Espionage Act authorized 
prosecution not only of government employees for leaking classified 
information but also of other people, including journalists, who 
transmitted the information or even just received it.  The convening 
of a grand jury to investigate leaks about the National Security 
Agency’s classified program of warrantless spying on phone calls, 
Kitrosser says, is yet another example of this crackdown.143 
The more recent skirmish between the government and the 
reporters who published stories about NSA leaks involved James 
Risen and Eric Lichtblau of The New York Times.  Late in 2005, they 
reported that the NSA was violating U.S. law by eavesdropping on 
U.S. citizens without getting the warrants required by the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act.144 
Commentator Keith Werhan says that the Pentagon Papers case 
has a “strong default rule making prior restraints on national security 
grounds next to impossible,” and he uses the Risen-Lichtblau story as 
an example of the strength of this alleged default rule.  According to 
Werhan, government officials met with Times editors to try to 
persuade them to spike the story.  The government got the story 
delayed for a year, pushing its publication after the 2004 presidential 
elections, and the Times did delete some information.  The published 
Newsgathering Crimes, 36 AM. J. CRIM. L. 129, 130–32 (2002).  See the Lee article, passim, 
for coverage of the general topic of the complex relationship between reporters and their 
confidential sources.  See also, William E. Lee, Deep Background: Journalists, Sources, 
and the Perils of Leaking, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1453 (2008); Richard B. Kielbowicz, The Role 
of News Leaks in Governance and the Law of Journalists’ Confidentiality, 43 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 425 (2006); Rick Karr, Rick Karr on Government Secrecy (PBS broadcast on Feb.
28, 2008), available at http:// www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/02292008/profile4.html (last
visited Feb. 5, 2011) (covering the federal grand jury investigation against Risen and
Lichtblau).
143. Kitrosser, supra note 142, at 883–84 .
144. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/16program.html.  
In May 2011, Congress passed a four-year extension to parts of the controversial 
PATRIOT Act that address surveillance techniques that were set to expire.  Paul Kane & 
Felicia Sonmez, Congress approves extension of USA Patriot Act provisions, WASH. POST., 
May 27, 2011, http://www. washingtonpost.com/AGGgXICH_story.html. 
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story said that it omitted “some information that administration 
officials argued could be useful to terrorists.”145 
The Risen and Lichtblau story, as well as a Washington Post story 
published six weeks earlier by Dana Priest about the CIA’s prisons 
overseas that used “enhanced interrogation techniques” such as 
waterboarding,146 won Pulitzer Prizes.  The Bush administration 
denounced both stories as compromising the government’s war on 
terrorism.147  Instead of apologizing for breaching Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act law, President Bush called the leak about the 
warrantless surveillance “a shameful act.”  Some critics even said that 
The New York Times had committed treason.148 
While no indictments were ever handed down against Risen and 
Lichtblau, Thomas A. Drake was not so lucky.  Drake, a former NSA 
senior executive, was indicted.  According to information released by 
Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer of the Criminal 
Division of the Department of Justice, a grand jury in the District of 
Maryland charged that Drake was the source for newspaper articles 
about the NSA published between February 2006 and November 
2007. 
The indictment alleged that, among other things, he engaged in 
the following activities to provide highly classified information to a 
reporter: 
exchanging hundreds of e-mails with and meeting with the 
reporter; . . . copying and pasting classified and unclassified 
information from NSA documents into untitled word 
145. Werhan, supra note 65, at 1561, 1574 (quoting Risen & Lichtblau, supra note
144). 
146. Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH. POST, Nov, 2,
2005, at A1. 
147. See Laura Rozen, Hung Out to Dry: The National-Security Press Dug Up the Dirt,
but Congress Wilted, COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REV. (Jan. 22, 2009), available at http:// 
www.cjr.org/transparency/hung_out_to_dry_1.php?page=all. 
148. See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Lapdogs, Watchdogs, and Scapegoats: The Press and
National Security Information, 83 IND. L.J. 233, 235–36 (2008); see also Werhan, supra note 
65, at 1561, 1574 (calling the story a “shameful act”).  President Bush also said that the 
story was “helping the enemy,” and a Congressional resolution condemning The New 
York Times for possible endangerment of American lives garnered 210 votes.  Id. at 1574–
75. 
On wiretapping done by presidents, and particularly by President George W. Bush, see 
generally, Heidi Kitrosser, Symposium, Law at the Intersection of National Security, 
Privacy, and Technology: It Came from Beneath the Twilight Zone: Wiretapping and 
Article II Imperialism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1401 (2010).  See also Robert M. Chesney, National 
Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361 (2009) (exploring whether judges should 
defer to the executive branch on facts in national security cases). 
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processing documents which, when printed, had the 
classification markings removed; . . . scanning and emailing 
electronic copies of classified and unclassified documents to 
the reporter from his home computer; and reviewing, 
commenting on, and editing drafts of the reporter’s articles. 
According to Breuer, Drake shredded documents and lied to 
federal agents.  Because of national security needs, Breuer said, 
Drake’s disclosure of classified information warranted that he be 
“prosecuted vigorously.”149 
Drake was scheduled to go on trial in June 2011.  He defended 
himself publicly in a May 2011 The New Yorker article: 
“I’m a target,” he said. “I’ve got a bull’s-eye on my back.”  He 
continued, “I did not tell secrets. I am facing prison for having 
raised an alarm, period.  I went to a reporter with a few key 
things: fraud, waste, and abuse, and the fact that there were 
legal alternatives to the Bush Administration’s ‘dark side’—in 
particular, warrantless domestic spying by the N.S.A.”150 
But instead of going to trial or to jail, he pled guilty to a single 
misdemeanor charge of exceeding authorized use of a government 
computer, in order to share that computer’s contents with persons 
unauthorized to receive the shared information.  Under the 
agreement, Drake would receive no jail time.  Originally, the 
government had sought conviction on ten felony charges, including 
violating the Espionage Act.151  In short, the “vigorous prosecution” 
seemed to fizzle out.152  On July 15, 2011, Drake received a sentence 
149. See DEPT. OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, Former NSA Senior
Executive Charged with Illegally Retaining Classified Information, Obstructing Justice and 
Making False Statements, (Apr. 15, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/ 
pr/2010/April/10-crm-416.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2011). 
150. See Jane Mayer, The Secret Sharer, NEW YORKER, May 23, 2011, at 46, 48.
Mayer named the reporter as Siobhan Gorman of the Baltimore Sun.  According to 
Mayer, Gorman “has not been charged with wrongdoing.” 
151. See, e.g., Jane Mayer, A Deal in the N.S.A. Case, NEW YORKER, June 9, 2011,
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2011/06/a-deal-in-the-nsa-case.html. 
152. The Washington Post quoted Jesselyn Radack, the director of national security
for the Government Accountability Project, as saying of the plea agreement that “It’s an 
unambiguous victory for Drake” and that “The prosecution’s case imploded.”  Ellen 
Nakashima, Ex-NSA Official Thomas Drake to Plead Guilty to Misdemeanor, WASH. 
POST, June 9, 2011,  http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/national-security/ex-nsa-
manager-has-reportedly-twice-rejected-plea-bargains-in-espionage-act-case/2011/06/09/ 
AG89ZHNH_story.html.  Smithsonian Magazine also quoted Radack as saying that 
President Obama’s Administration “has brought more leak prosecutions than all previous 
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of one year on probation and 240 hours of community service from 
United States Judge Richard D. Bennett, who from the bench 
rebuked the government and called it “unconscionable” for the 
government to put Drake and his family through “four years of hell” 
before folding on all felony charges.153  On December 22, 2010, former 
CIA agent Jeffrey Sterling was indicted by a federal grand jury in St. 
Louis for allegedly giving classified information to a journalist about a 
secret endeavor to impede weapon development by some foreign 
countries.  Sterling was arrested in St. Louis on January 6.  Although 
the indictment does not specifically say that Sterling was passing 
secret information to journalist James Risen, the details led The New 
York Times to conclude that Risen received information from 
Sterling that then appeared in Risen’s 2006 book, State of War: The 
Secret History of the C.I.A. and the Bush Administration.154 
Federal District Judge Leonie M. Brinkema quashed a subpoena 
for journalist Risen in November 2010, but prosecutors subpoenaed 
him again in May 2011.155  According to Justice Department rules, 
prosecutors can only seek information from journalists if the 
information is both essential and cannot be gained in any other 
manner.156  Federal prosecutors were able to indict Sterling without 
presidential administrations combined.”  David Wise, Leaks and the Law:  The Story of 
Thomas Drake, SMITHSONIAN MAGAZINE, Aug. 2011, available at http:// 
www.smithsonianmag.com/history-archaeology/Leaks-and-the-Law-The-Story-of-Thomas-
Drake.html.  She introduced Thomas Drake when he received the $10,000 Ridenhour 
Prize for Truth-Telling from the National Press Club in Washington, D.C. in April 2011. 
Id.   As President-elect, President Obama also had praised government whistleblowers, 
speaking of the “courage and patriotism” of whistle-blowing and saying it “should be 
encouraged rather than stifled.”  Id. 
153. See, e.g., Tricia Bishop, No Jail Time for Ex-NSA Official; Thomas Drake,
Accused of Espionage, Gets Probation After Case Collapses, THE BALTIMORE SUN, July 
16, 2011, at 1A.  See also Scott Shane, Ex-N.S.A. Official Takes Plea Deal; Setback for 
U.S., N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2011, at 1.  In a case that received relatively little publicity,
Shamai K. Leibowitz, a lawyer who worked as a Hebrew translator for the FBI on a
contract basis, pleaded guilty to leaking classified documents to an unnamed blogger.
Maria Glod, Former FBI Employee Sentenced in Classified Leak, WASH. POST, May 25,
2010 at B03 [hereinafter FBI Employee Sentenced].  See also Wise, supra note 152, and
Shane, supra note 152.  Although U.S. District Judge Alexander Williams, Jr., said during
the sentencing that government authorities persuaded him that this case involved a “very,
very serious offense,” he also said that “I don’t know what was divulged, other than some
documents, and I don’t know how it’s compromised things.”  See FBI Employee Sentenced.
154. See Charlie Savage, Ex-C.I.A. Officer Named in Disclosure Indictment, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 7, 2011, at 15 available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/07/us/07indict.html. 
155. Ellen Nakashima, Reporter Subpoenaed in Leaks Case, WASH. POST., May 24,
2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/reporter-subpoenaed-in-leaks-case/2011/05/ 
24/AFV2MiAH_story.html. 
156. Since 1980, prosecutorial guidelines have existed to help curb overzealous pursuit
of journalists’ sources. Published in the Code of Federal Regulations, the guidelines 
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Risen disclosing him as a source.  The indictment includes details of 
phone conversations and e-mail exchanges between Sterling and the 
unnamed journalist.157 
Subpoenas on the media are having an impact: the discussion is 
not just academic.158   RonNell Andersen Jones rejects the notion that 
there is an “avalanche” of subpoenas.159  But Jones concludes that 
there is a problem with subpoenas.  In 2006 she conducted a survey 
and then compared her data with a comparable survey done in 2001 
by the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press.  She stated 
that “analysis of the survey data suggests that federal subpoenas may 
be both more frequent than they were five years ago and more 
common than opponents of a federal shield law have suggested.”160 
explain the rationale for limiting prosecutors’ power over journalists—preserving the 
functioning of the press: 
Because freedom of the press can be no broader than the freedom of 
reporters to investigate and report the news, the prosecutorial power of 
the government should not be used in such a way that it impairs a 
reporter’s responsibility to cover as broadly as possible controversial 
public issues. This policy statement is thus intended to provide protection 
for the news media from forms of compulsory process, whether civil or 
criminal, which might impair the news gathering function. 
28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (1980). 
157. Savage, supra note 154.  In April 2011, a federal prosecutor told Judge Brinkema
that “potential witness issues” might prevent the case from going to trial. The prosecutor 
did not describe the problem or say which witness was causing trouble, but the Associated 
Press said, “it seems clear that testimony from Risen, who has not cooperated with the 
investigation, is key to the government’s case.”  See Associated Press, Prosecutor Says 
Witness Issue May Prevent Leak Case Against Ex-CIA Officer From Going to Trial, 
WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/prosecutor-leak-case-
against-ex-cia-man-may-not-go-to-trial-because-of-witness-problem/2011/04/08/AFn2jf2C_ 
story.html. 
Prosecutors in the case took the uncommon step of subpoenaing Sterling’s attorney, Mark 
Zaid of Washington, D.C. This brought criticism that this subpoena of prosecutor was 
violating Rule 3.8 of the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Conduct that say that 
prosecutors may only subpoena an attorney to testify about a client if (1) the prosecutor 
does not believe that the information sought is covered by the attorney-client privilege, (2) 
the information is “essential,” and (3) there are no alternative sources of the information. 
See William H. Freivogel, Feds take Unusual Step of Subpoenaing Sterling’s Lawyer, ST. 
LOUIS BEACON, Jan. 21, 2011, http://www.stlbeacon.org/issues-politics /nation /107662-
sterling-lawyers-subpoena. 
158. See RonNell Anderson Jones, Media Subpoenas, Impact, Perception and Legal
Protection in the Changing World of American Journalism, 84 WASH. L. REV. 317 (2009). 
159. See Jones, Avalanche or Undue Alarm? An Empirical Study of Subpoenas
Received by the News Media, 93 MINN. L. REV. 585, 667 (2008). 
160. Id. at 637.
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Between 2001 and 2006, federal subpoenas nearly doubled.161  
Both the 2006 survey and respondents’ comments led Jones to say 
that these federal subpoenas are having an “increasing impact” on 
newsrooms nationwide.  Jones says her work suggests that in 2006 
federal subpoenas were served on 10.3 percemt of U.S. media 
organizations.  Larger media organizations received the brunt of the 
subpoenas, with 70 percent of newspaper subpoenas being served on 
the 100 largest daily newspapers (out of 1,400) and over half of 
broadcaster subpoenas being served in markets of one million or 
more households.162 
According to Lucy A. Dalglish, executive director of Reporters 
Committee for Freedom of the Press, and Casey Murray, “Two time 
periods . . . stand out for the sheer volume of subpoenas served on the 
media—the late 1960s through the early 1970s, when government 
officials aggressively went after political groups and others deemed to 
be ‘subversive,’ and . . . when the post-9/11 atmosphere caused federal 
and state governments to clamp down on the public release of 
government information.”  They maintain that this “culture of 
conspiracy” has resulted in media organizations using more 
anonymous sources than ever before.163 
IX. National Security
How valuable is openness in a society?  How much openness 
should be sacrificed in the name of security?  Reaching the 
appropriate balance between openness and security is a difficult, 
contentious task. Trying to determine the appropriate decision-maker 
is also difficult and contentious. 
Of course, not everyone agrees with unilateral press decisions to 
release information.  Gabriel Schoenfeld in Necessary Secrets: 
National Security, the Media, and the Rule of Law164 challenges the 
press.  He favors the government over the press on national security 
161. Id. at 638.
162. Id. at 638.  Federal subpoenas were served in 32 states and the District of
Columbia.  Id. 
163. Lucy A. Dalglish & Casey Murray, Deja Vu All Over Again: How a Generation of
Gains in Federal Reporter’s Privilege Law is Being Reversed, 29 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.
REV. 13, 13 (2006).
164. GABRIEL SCHOENFELD, NECESSARY SECRETS: NATIONAL SECURITY, THE
MEDIA, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2010).
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issues, and his book received some glowing endorsements, even in 
The New York Times.165 
Consumer activist and unsuccessful presidential candidate Ralph 
Nader decried classification of documents that he says should not 
have been classified.  He maintains that “there’s just so many things 
that have been declassified later, or leaked, that were absurd to [be] 
classified.”166 
Heidi Kitrosser arguably goes a step further than Nader, saying 
that excessive classification is dangerous.  She says that “secrecy often 
is at best unnecessary and at worst deeply harmful to national 
security.”  Arguably, the need for secrecy is “dramatically 
overstated,” she says, and “excessive secrecy hurts national security 
by encouraging poorly informed and under-vetted decision-making 
and diminishing the United States’ domestic and international 
credibility.”167 
165. The New York Times review of Schoenfeld’s book said, in part: “In his aptly titled
book, ‘Necessary Secrets,’ Gabriel Schoenfeld, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, has 
presented a subtle and instructive brief challenging the right of the press to make 
unilateral decisions to ‘publish and let others perish,’ as he puts it somewhat 
tendentiously.” See Alan M. Dershowtiz, Who Needs to Know?,  N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com /2010/05/30/books/review/Dershowitz-t.html. 
Another review of Necessary Secrets said this: 
In December 2005, The New York Times revealed a secret National 
Security Agency operation that spied on Al Qaeda’s communications. 
Six months later the Times reported that the U.S. government gained 
access to an international financial clearinghouse, which allowed the feds 
to track the financial transfers of Al Qaeda. By the Times’s own 
accounts, these programs achieved significant successes; but the 
disclosure surely compromised that effectiveness. In most countries, the 
reporters who broke these stories—Eric Lichtblau and James Risen—
would have been placed in shackles and interred in the deepest dungeon, 
along with their editor, Bill Keller. In the United States, they receive 
prizes. 
Eric A. Posner, The Prudent and the Imprudent, NEW REPUBLIC (May 18, 2010), available 
at http://www.tnr.com/book/review/the-prudent-and-the-imprudent.  Probably very few 
people would argue that government has no need for any secrets whatsoever, and those 
few might very well also argue that there is no need for government, either.  For purposes 
of this discussion, an underlying assumption is that government does have some need of 
secrecy, although that need can be blown out of all proportion by governments that seek 
to govern outside of the view of their citizens and to sweep purely embarrassing 
information under the rug of classified information. 
166. Espionage Act and the Legal and Constitutional Issues Raised by WikiLeaks:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 96 (2010) (statement of Ralph 
Nader, Legal Advocate and Author). 
167. Heidi Kitrosser, Symposium, The Domestic Commander in Chief: Congressional
Oversight of National Security Activities, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1049, 1066 (2008).  See also 
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She questions what she calls the “conventional assumption” that 
volumes of information exist that would be dangerous in enemy 
hands, and says that persons from all political viewpoints have 
suggested that the United States unnecessarily classifies a lot of 
information.  For example, the Solicitor General for Richard Nixon, 
Erwin N. Griswold, who fought against publication of the Pentagon 
Papers, later acknowledged that he never even saw any suggestion 
that the Pentagon Papers endangered national security.  Instead, he 
spoke of the “massive overclassification” of government information, 
contending that “the principal concern of the classifiers is not with 
national security, but rather with governmental embarrassment of 
one sort or another.”168  She also questions the Bush Administration’s 
rationale for trying to keep the NSA eavesdropping a secret, referring 
to executive “spinning of information” with selective leaks and 
declassification.169 
But even Kitrosser says, “It is not remotely unreasonable, of 
course, for anyone to wish to block information that could assist 
terrorists.”  However, she is concerned that there is “massive abuse” 
of  claims about information aiding terrorism and that there are “very 
real risks”  to national security and the democratic process from an 
over-abundance of secrecy.170  In short, she warns of the “dangers of 
unchecked government secrecy.”171 
Christina E. Wells, State Secrets and Executive Accountability; Symposium,  Presidential 
Power in the Obama Administration:  Early Reflections, 46 CONST. COMMENTARY, INC. 
625 (2010) (discussing the state secrets privilege and court deference to government 
arguments for secrecy). 
168. Kitrosser, supra note 167, at 1066.
169. Kitrosser, supra note 167, at 1067.
170. Kitrosser, supra note 167, at 1088–89.
171. Kitrosser, supra note 167, at 1090.  This fear of secrecy as dangerous to national
security is echoed by a 2009 note in the Harvard Law Review, but the author also mistrusts 
media publication decision-making.  “Some secrecy is essential to both national security 
and democracy, but excessive secrecy undermines democratic accountability and 
decisionmaking, and sometimes national security itself.”  The government has an incentive 
to keep information secret, while the press benefits from publication of secrets, the note 
maintains.  Striking the appropriate balance between secrecy and disclosure is not 
something the note’s author would trust to government or to the press.  The press may 
well underestimate national security risks.  Note, Media Incentives and National Security 
Secrets, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2228 (2009).  The press needs to reform its decision-making 
process when trying to determine whether to publish, the note contends. Id. at 2229.  In 
particular, the note looks askance at “fear of being scooped” as a factor in decision-
making.  Id. at 2237–39.  See also Katherine L. Johansen, A Legion of Worries: National 
Security Reporting in the Age of the War on Terror 2008, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 5107 
(2008)  (discussing how journalists report national security stories). 
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In another article, Kitrosser questions “whether the 
Constitution . . . counsels substantial deference to political branch 
judgments regarding national security related speech suppression.” 
She says “no” because suppression of speech relating to national 
security is “more dangerous” than suppression of other types of 
speech.”172  Further, she maintains that “the First Amendment 
demands some breathing room for disclosure by those within the vast 
secret-keeping infrastructure as well as by the press and the public to 
whom information might be leaked.”173 
Protection for leakers seems an increasingly divisive issue in the 
days of WikiLeaks.  Although she was writing prior to the WikiLeaks 
saga, much of Mary-Rose Papandrea’s commentary directly aims at 
the issues WikiLeaks raises.  She speaks of the “complicated 
relationship between the executive branch and the press, particularly 
with respect to national security information” and the “virtually 
unbridled classification authority” of the executive branch.  The 
Freedom of Information Act and whistleblower laws are “largely 
ineffectual” when the issue is national security, she says.174 
Because national security information is under executive control, 
a “game of leaks” has developed, Papandrea claims, between the 
government and the press.  “During this game, the press alternatively 
serves as lapdogs, watchdogs, and scapegoats for the executive 
branch.  The press depends upon the government for news; the 
government in turn depends upon the press to communicate with the 
public.”  Since Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency, she says, leaks have 
become a primary method of communicating information, even 
classified information, to the public through a compliant press. 
Because of its power over information and because of its own leaks, 
the executive power to punish the press for publishing leaks should be 
“extremely limited,” she says: The government should have to prove 
intent or reckless disregard for harm to the United States by 
publishing leaks.175 
172. Kitrosser, supra note 142, at 881, 885.
173. Kitrosser, supra note 142, at 885–86.
174. See CIA v. Sims, discussed supra note 20.
175. Papandrea, supra note 148, at 236–37.  See also Derigan A. Silver, National
Security and the Press  The Government’s Ability to Prosecute Journalists for the 
Possession of Publication of National Security Information, 13 COMM. L. & POL’Y 447, 447 
(2008) (arguing that Congress should amend federal law “to limit prosecution to instances 
when there is evidence of intent to harm the United States”).  For more on government 
secrets, see also GEOFFREY STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME: FROM 
THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2004). 
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Keith Werhan agrees with Papandrea on limiting the executive 
power to punish the press for leaks.  He says, “There are few 
absolutes in constitutional jurisprudence, and there surely are 
extraordinary circumstances in which the principle of press autonomy 
(like every other fundamental right) should be overridden by 
competing social costs.”176 
Preventing a terrorist attack or other such deadly violence is an 
example of an extraordinary circumstance justifying a government 
subpoena of the press.  But without such circumstances, Werhan says, 
he does not think prosecutors can justify subpoenaing the press even 
if necessary to reveal a “government leaker.”  He says, “The leaking 
of classified information is an everyday occurrence, and the necessity 
of a journalist’s testimony to prove the case against a government 
leaker beyond reasonable doubt likely would be the rule rather than 
the exception.”177 
Werhan would countenance criminal prosecution for publication 
of classified information if prosecution furthered “a state interest of 
the highest order.”178  He mentions the “extreme security risks” of 
publishing sailing dates of ships transporting troops, or technical 
information for designing weapons of mass destruction, or 
undercover CIA agents’ identities.179 
Rodney A. Smolla echoes the “watchdog” theme.  He says: 
There should be no per se “carve out” for national security 
matters. We live at a time in American history in which the 
watchdog role of a free and aggressive press is more vital than 
ever, and that watchdog role must above all include the vital 
and historic role of the press as a check and balance on the 
actions of the national government in matters relating to 
national security and foreign affairs. 
To ensure a balance between “truly important national security 
secrets” and the watchdog press, Smolla calls for “qualified 
protection” for confidentiality promises by newsgatherers.  But he 
176. Werhan, supra note 65, at 1561, 1604.  Werhan explains, “I am not a First
Amendment absolutist. Not many people are. There are circumstances in which our rights 
to free speech and a free press must give way to competing societal interests. National 
security can be such an interest, but it is not inevitably so.”  Id. at 1592. 
177. Werhan, supra note 65, at 1604–05.
178. Werhan, supra note 65, at 1594 (citing the “Daily Mail principle”); see also Smith,
supra note 82. 
179. Werhan, supra note 65, at 1594.
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tips the balance in favor of national security.  Although he does not 
want a “blanket exception” for national security interests, he does say 
that national security would usually trump privilege—with the caveat 
that “we should preserve the possibility that the invocation of the 
national security interest would be overridden by courts when it is a 
sham.”180 
David Rudenstine argues in favor of extending shield law 
protection in alleged matters of national security.  Although he also 
wrote prior to the WikiLeaks situation, his argument also seems 
highly applicable to it.  He rails against the “enormous shift” of power 
to the executive branch in matters concerning national security and 
the danger created by secret use of power.181 
This vast, secretly exercised power creates a “direct threat” to 
democratic government, Rudenstine says.  He strongly supports 
shield law, maintaining that confidential sources are a necessity for 
reporting about national security matters.  Why?  “[B]ecause almost 
all information pertinent to national security is classified, thus 
preventing those with lawful access to it from revealing it to the press. 
It is only because some individuals do make such information public 
that we have access to it.”182 
While Anthony Lewis flatly states that “the press does not always 
have right and justice on its side,” he values protecting confidential 
sources.  He cites The New York Times’ NSA story, calling it “vitally 
important” because it shed light on “lawless executive activity,” as 
well as The Washington Post’s story on CIA interrogations in secret 
European prisons.  Lewis contends that “[n]either of those stories 
could have been reported without the use of confidential sources. 
180. Smolla, supra note 96, at 1423, 1430.
181. Rudenstine presents a laundry list of secret uses of executive power:
[S]ince 9/11, the executive has, without public disclosure and debate,
engaged in eavesdropping on United States citizens, monitored
international banking transactions, tortured individuals subject to
executive detention, executed signing statements to disavow the
executive’s duty to faithfully execute the laws, and authorized
renditions—the extraordinary practice of kidnapping and shipping a
suspected terrorist to a nation state such as Syria or Egypt—where the
suspect will be tortured.
Rudenstine, supra note 96, at 1431, 1433. 
182. Rudenstine, supra note 96, at 1431, 1433 (footnotes omitted).
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And without, I should add, great courage on the part of the 
journalists and their newspapers.”183 
As for shield law, Lewis says that the government’s argument 
about the national-security need for testimony poses a “serious 
obstacle” to Congress passing a shield law.  He cites the suggestion of 
Geoffrey Stone that to skirt this problem, shield law should provide 
for journalists being subpoenaed if their testimony could help in cases 
involving an “imminent” national security threat.184 
But Lewis criticizes Stone’s suggestion, saying, “The trouble with 
that proposed exception is that it could easily become as wide as a 
barn door.  The most important press disclosures have had to do with 
what the government says is national security: the Pentagon Papers 
case, warrantless wiretapping, secret CIA prisons.”  While the 
government often says the nation’s fate is at stake, according to 
Lewis, judges are wary of second-guessing these national security 
claims.185 
Lewis has company in fearing that national security poses an 
obstacle to federal shield-law enactment.  According to Jane Kirtley, 
the Justice Department has “vigorously opposed” proposed federal 
shield laws, and national security is a reason.  She cites as an example 
the testimony by a Justice Department representative at a June 2007 
hearing that shield laws would protect leaks and thus be a threat to 
national security, and that persons covered by the shield law would 
include “a terrorist operative who videotaped a message from a 
terrorist leader threatening attacks on Americans, because he would 
be engaged in recording news or information that concerns 
international events for dissemination to the public.”186 
183. Like Papandrea and Werhan, Lewis comments on the Bush administration calling
the reporters traitors and focusing on the leaks, not the “flagrant” law violations.  He also 
commented that compared to recent abuses of power, “the Pentagon Papers conflict of 
1971 seems like simpler days.” Anthony Lewis, Panel Discussion, Are Journalists 
Privileged? 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1353, 1353–54 (2008). 
184. Id. at 1357, n.9 and accompanying text (citing Geoffrey R. Stone, Half a Shield Is
Better Than None, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/21/ 
opinion/21stone.html. 
185. Id. at 1357.
186. Jane E. Kirtley, Reporter’s Privilege in the 21st Century: Despite the Ongoing
Controversy Concerning Adoption of a Federal Reporter’s Privilege Statute, the Idea is 
Neither New, Nor Novel, 25 DEL. LAWYER 12, 15 (2007/2008) (quoting Hearing Before the 
House Comm. on the Judiciary Concerning H.R. 2102, the Free Flow of Information Act of 
2007, 109th Congress 18 (2007)  (statement of Rachel L. Brand, Assistant Att’y Gen., 
Office of Legal Policy), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/pdf/hr2102_brand_hjc_ 
061407.pdf. 
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Kirtley sees protection of sources as necessary for supplying 
information for public debate: “Stories ranging from Watergate, the 
Enron scandal, abuse at Abu Ghraib prison, and conditions at Walter 
Reed Army Medical Center depended, at least in part, on 
confidential sources.”  Without protection for such sources, she says, 
information and debate will suffer.187 
Lewis also has company in thinking that a national-security 
exception to shield protection could become overbroad.  For 
example, Kristen Anastos says of proposed federal shield legislation: 
“The national security exception, without which this or any future-
proposed Act has little chance of passing, gives the government too 
wide a loophole with which to bypass the constraints of the Act.”188
And Heidi Kitrosser speaks of “a reflexive willingness to slash 
informed public debate at its root in the name of national security.”189 
Even the Supreme Court has shown unease with the government 
having too close control over information.  In Smith v. Daily Mail 
Publishing Co., the Court said: “A free press cannot be made to rely 
solely upon the sufferance of government to supply it with 
information.”190 
Now say that a member of the press has gotten hold of and 
published some classified information.  And further, say that the 
Justice Department is unwilling or unable to indict a media outlet for 
disseminating classified information.  A federal prosecutor can make 
an end run that can accomplish much the same goal by convening a 
grand jury to uncover the source of the leak.  The judge can then 
order a subpoenaed journalist to disclose the source of the leak or go 
to jail, while the confidential source waits, wondering if the journalist 
faced with such a Hobson’s choice will choose revelation over 
incarceration.  Such prospects could perhaps chill even the most 
heated leaker who is incensed over government wrongdoing—
wrongdoing that is shielded from public inspection by a system of 
classification and the incantation of “national security.”  With 
187. Id. at 16.
188. Kristen Anastos, Note, Protecting the Public Interest? Why Qualified Legislative
Protection Undermines the Need for a Federal Reporters’ Privilege, 31 SETON HALL LEGIS. 
J. 463, 464 (2006).
189. Kitrosser, supra note 142, at 881, 884.  On the other hand, W. Cory Reiss wants to
treat national security information differently than any other material.  He says that this 
would “mitigate” some agencies’ concerns over a shield law. Reiss, supra note 59, at 641, 
664–65.  He proposes a three-part test for gaining a privilege when national security is 
involved: “a track record, a process of deliberation and verification, and transparency.” 
Id. at 668–69. 
190. Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 104 (1979).
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increasing prosecutorial pressure on journalists, sources could fade 
away, taking their information with them and leaving government 
misadventure undisclosed and undeterred. 
X. Secrecy and Precedents in the Age of WikiLeaks
For all leakers of information that the government wants to keep 
secret, secrecy is a two-edged sword.  Generally, leakers do not want 
the government to have secrecy, but they want secrecy themselves to 
avoid prosecution. 
For receivers of leaked information who are within the U.S. 
government’s reach, the threat of a grand jury subpoena and a court 
order to reveal the source of the leaked information is a serious 
threat. The Supreme Court in Branzburg v. Hayes was not 
sympathetic to confidential sources because the Court found a 
compelling governmental need when the concern was fighting 
crime.191 
The need could override any First Amendment values raised by 
those who did not want to reveal their confidential sources in front of 
grand juries.192  Thus, if the U.S. government could subpoena Julian 
Assange, then it could order him to reveal his source(s) of 
information for WikiLeaks. 
But perhaps Assange or any other receiver of leaked information 
does have a way around Branzburg: ignorance.  Assange maintains 
that he does not know who his sources of information are because he 
has purposefully designed his information-gathering system not to be 
able to trace sources. Assange says: “We do not know whether Mr. 
Manning is our source or not. . . . [O]ur technology does not permit us 
to understand whether someone is one of our sources or not because 
the best way to keep a secret is to never have it.”193 
191. The Court opined:
The requirements of those cases . . . which hold that a State’s interest
must be “compelling” or “paramount” to justify even an indirect burden
on First Amendment rights, are also met here. As we have indicated, the
investigation of crime by the grand jury implements a fundamental
governmental role of securing the safety of the person and property of
the citizen.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 701 (1972) (citations omitted). 
192. For coverage of Branzburg, see notes 98–114 and accompanying text.
193. WikiSecrets, supra note 1; see also, CNN Presents Wiki Wars, supra note 1
(quoting Nick Davies of The Guardian).  Of course, there is controversy over whether 
Assange really is ignorant of the source of some of his WikiLeaks information.  See supra 
note 1 and accompanying text.  “WikiSecrets” also covered the controversy over whether 
 
2011] LEAKS, LEAKERS, AND JOURNALISTS 81
Impossibility (or ignorance) would seem a plausible defense to a 
possible contempt citation for refusal to reveal one’s source when 
ordered to do so by a judge during grand jury proceedings.  In short, 
technology has arguably  softened the bite of Branzburg in the age of 
WikiLeaks. 
While the Supreme Court found that the need to fight crime 
trumped alleged First Amendment needs in Branzburg, it found that 
the First Amendment trumped any other considerations in Bartnicki 
v. Vopper, which itself echoed Pearson v. Dodd.194  The question that
reporters must ask themselves, either when receiving illegally
recorded phone conversations as in Bartnicki, or when receiving
information gained through trespass as in Pearson, is whether the
information is of legitimate public concern.  In other words, the
reporters must ask themselves whether the information is
newsworthy.  If it is newsworthy, and not merely a matter of private
concern, then the reporters may use it.
Bartnicki and Pearson would seem to protect Julian Assange and 
newspapers such as The New York Times if they merely received 
information without soliciting it, and then disseminated the 
information.  Likewise, New York Times v. United States195 would 
stand as a potent precedent for protecting The New York Times from 
punishment for publishing classified information that it received from 
Assange. 
Protection from the Pentagon Papers case, however, would seem 
penetrable. As Justice Byron White said in his concurring opinion: 
When the Espionage Act was under consideration in 1917, 
Congress eliminated from the bill a provision that would have 
given the President broad powers in time of war to proscribe, 
under threat of criminal penalty, the publication of various 
Manning confessed to leaking to WikiLeaks.  When specifically asked about the 
“Collateral Murder” video, Assange said, “There was discussion [internally] about, you 
know, we have a situation where there’s a young man held in military prison under 
investigation who’s alleged to be a source for the ‘Collateral Murder’ video. But we have 
published and received military documents long before Bradley Manning ever joined the 
Army.”  As for the later release of diplomatic cables, there was internal dissension. 
Daniel Domscheit-Berg, who left WikiLeaks in 2010, said, “It was clear for me that these 
diplomatic cables should not be released . . . Because it was unclear how much that would 
implicate someone that had gotten into trouble.”  He said, “My gut and my heart say that 
you should protect the person.”  Id. 
194. See supra notes 67–76 and accompanying text .
195. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). See also supra notes
106–120 and accompanying text. 
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categories of information related to the national defense. 
Congress at that time was unwilling to clothe the President 
with such far-reaching powers to monitor the press, and those 
opposed to this part of the legislation assumed that a 
necessary concomitant of such power was the power to “filter 
out the news to the people through some man.”  55 Cong. 
Rec. 2008 (remarks of Sen. Ashurst).  However, these same 
members of Congress appeared to have little doubt that 
newspapers would be subject to criminal prosecution if they 
insisted on publishing information of the type Congress had 
itself determined should not be revealed. Senator Ashurst, for 
example, was quite sure that the editor of such a newspaper 
“should be punished if he did publish information as to the 
movements of the fleet, the troops, the aircraft, the location of 
powder factories, the location of defense works, and all that 
sort of thing.”196 
If a clear case of revealing troop movements were to be found in 
the WikiLeaks documents, then Near v. Minnesota 197could also offer 
a theoretical possibility of an injunction against publishers of such 
information.  The injunction would have to apply to future 
publications; once information is out on the Web, getting it back 
would be more difficult than putting the proverbial toothpaste back in 
the tube.  The die would already be cast.  Of course, enforcement of 
even a prospective injunction could prove difficult at best, given the 
worldwide digital tentacles of WikiLeaks.198 
196. New York Times, 403 U.S. at 733–34 (White, J. concurring) (emphasis added).
197. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). See also supra notes 52–53 and
accompanying text. 
198. Based on The New York Times’ scrubbing of WikiLeaks documents for names,
the possibility of the Times reporting troop movements seems remote. According to the 
Times, the types of information that have been removed from the documents include: 
Names or precise identifying information of sources. Names of buildings 
under surveillance. Names of prisoners. Names of kidnap victims. Times 
required for various tactical military reactions. Radio frequencies or 
phone numbers used in insurgent communications. Names of public 
figures (generals, prominent police officials, governors, warlords and 
senior afghan officials) have not been redacted, though on a case-by-case 
basis, the names of lower-level employees have been removed. Similarly, 
well-known insurgent commanders or terrorists are not redacted, but the 
names of lower-level figures are. 
C.J. Shivers et al., Text From a Selection of the Secret Dispatches, N.Y. TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/world/26warlogs.html.
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And even if the government arguably could pursue The New York 
Times, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder is already on the record as 
saying the government will not seek sanctions against the Times.199  
But no publication over which the United States could assert 
jurisdiction would be immune from restraint if troop-movement 
information became the problem and if the government wanted to 
take action. The H-Bomb case, United States v. Progressive,200 would 
stand as a precedent for any type of troop-movement leaks for which 
the government sought an injunction. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of the 
effectiveness of injunctions, if they are to be granted.  In Nebraska 
Press Association v. Stuart,201 a case concerning the issuance of gag 
orders in order to preserve a defendant’s right to a fair trial, the Court 
emphasized that “prior restraints on speech and publication are the 
most serious and the least tolerable infringement of First Amendment 
rights.”202  Prior restraints could be imposed in cases that passed Judge 
Learned Hand’s version of the clear and present danger test, namely, 
whether “the gravity of the ‘evil,’ discounted by its improbability, 
justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the 
danger.”203  But such invasion of free speech could not be justified if 
In a “note to readers” published with the Afghanistan documents, the Times said: 
Most of the incident reports are marked “secret,” a relatively low level of 
classification. The Times has taken care not to publish information that 
would harm national security interests. The Times and the other news 
organizations agreed at the outset that we would not disclose—either in 
our articles or any of our online supplementary material—anything that 
was likely to put lives at risk or jeopardize military or antiterrorist 
operations. We have, for example, withheld any names of operatives in 
the field and informants cited in the reports. We have avoided anything 
that might compromise American or allied intelligence-gathering 
methods such as communications intercepts. We have not linked to the 
archives of raw material. At the request of the White House, The Times 
also urged WikiLeaks to withhold any harmful material from its Web 
site. 
Piecing Together the Reports, and Deciding What to Publish, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/26/world/26editors-note.html.  See also Julie Moos, News 
Organizations Publish WikiLeaks Documents With Caution, Innovation, POYNTER (Oct. 
24, 2010, 5:44 AM), http://www.poynter.org/uncategorized/106490/. 
199. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
200. United States v. Progressive, 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979). See also supra
notes 44–50 and accompanying text. 
201. Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
202. Id. at 559.
203. Id. at 562.
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other alternatives existed and if a restraining order would not 
“effectively . . . operate to prevent the threatened danger.”204 
As for an injunction against WikiLeaks itself, as noted before, 
that would seem a futile endeavor because the “effectiveness” of an 
injunction would be problematic given its worldwide reach. 
WikiLeaks’ design would almost certainly negate most if not all 
external attempts at containing its content.  Attempts at enforcement 
would thus seem to start a digital game of whack-a-mole, with an 
injunction against one WikiLeaks site simply leading to the posting by 
another WikiLeaks site, and on and on. 
In The New Yorker, Raffi Khatchadourian explained the difficulty 
of trying to remove WikiLeaks material from the Internet: 
Assange also wanted to insure that, once the video was posted 
online, it would be impossible to remove. He told me that 
WikiLeaks maintains its content on more than twenty servers 
around the world and on hundreds of domain names. 
(Expenses are paid by donations, and a few independent well-
wishers also run “mirror sites” in support.)  Assange calls the 
site “an uncensorable system for untraceable mass document 
leaking and public analysis,” and a government or company 
that wanted to remove content from WikiLeaks would have to 
practically dismantle the Internet itself.205 
204. Id.
205. Raffi Khatchadourian, No Secrets, NEW YORKER, June 7, 2010, at 40 (emphasis
added).  Khatchadourian uses WikiLeaks’ stance against Scientology to demonstrate 
WikiLeaks’ tough stance against opponents, saying he “typically tells would-be litigants to 
go to hell.”  After WikiLeaks leaked the church’s secret manuals and lawyers for 
Scientology demanded their removal, Assange posted more Scientology material and 
proclaimed: “WikiLeaks will not comply with legally abusive requests from Scientology 
any more than WikiLeaks has complied with similar demands from Swiss banks, Russian 
offshore stem-cell centers, former African kleptocrats, or the Pentagon.”  Id.  Not only 
does Assange take revenge when he considers himself to have been crossed, but so do his 
followers.  After Frontline aired “WikiSecrets,” hackers attacked PBS’s servers and 
posted thousands of stolen passwords.  They also posted a fake story about Tupac Shakur 
titled “Tupac still alive in New Zealand” on a PBS Newshour blog.  A hacker group called 
Lulzsec claimed responsibility.  Google News indexed the story, and even though PBS 
took the story down, it spread through Facebook and Twitter.  See, e.g., Kevin Poulsen, 
Hacktivists Scorch PBS in Retaliation for WikiLeaks Documentary, THREAT LEVEL (May 
30, 2011, 3:29 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/05/lulzsec/.  Assange followers 
also staged distributed denial of service attacks.  Hacktivists who call themselves 
“Anonymous” mounted, for example, an “Operation Payback” against MasterCard after 
MasterCard had announced in December 2010 that it would not process attempted 
donations to WikiLeaks because MasterCard considered WikiLeaks’ behavior to be 
illegal.  Anonymous temporarily shut down MasterCard.   PayPal, which had announced 
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While enjoining WikiLeaks would be difficult if not impossible, 
enjoining Manning is a different story.  He could theoretically find 
himself in legal difficulty for his revelations, again assuming he is 
guilty, even if the government did not pursue criminal charges.  An 
injunction against him could be a possibility.  Snepp206 involved no 
classified information, but the former CIA agent’s revelations about 
his service during the Vietnam War arguably did compromise the 
appearance of confidentiality.  During the hearing, the then-head of 
the CIA testified that sources of information were drying up.  
Likewise, the government could argue that the leaking of 
information such as State Department cables could compromise the 
appearance of confidentiality, inhibiting the sort of free flow of 
information that is essential for diplomats to carry out their 
diplomatic service.  And if the information were also secret, then that 
would constitute another compelling reason for acting against the 
leaker of the information.  The civil remedies could include an 
injunction against any further leaks and damages.207  Snepp’s 
publisher, however, did not receive sanctions.  Assange and The New 
York Times, of course, would stand in the same shoes as Snepp’s 
publisher. 
Criminal prosecution, however, seems the most likely outcome of 
the WikiLeaks situation.  Bradly Manning is clearly within the 
government’s bullseye.  He has already been imprisoned while 
awaiting trial.  Assuming that Manning gave WikiLeaks massive 
doses of confidential information, then he is guilty of violating valid 
criminal laws encoded in the Espionage Act.  This U.S. Army 
that it would freeze WikiLeaks’ account, also suffered a denial-of-service attack.  And 
Anonymous also temporarily shut down the Swedish prosecution’s website.  See Esther 
Addley & Josh Halliday, Operation Payback cripples MasterCard site in revenge for 
WikiLeaks ban, GUARDIAN, Dec. 8, 2010 http://www.guardian.coluk/media/2010/dec/ 
08/operation-payback-mastercard-website-wikileaks.  Anonymous also targeted Visa, see 
Student Charged Over Anonymous’ Attacks in Support of WikiLeaks, TELEGRAPH, Aug. 
26, 2011, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/8723333/Student-
charged-over-Anonymous-attacks-in-support-of-wikileaks.html (British student Peter 
Gibson was charged with conspiring to amount a distributed denial of service attack).  For 
more on how “Anonymous” performs its attacks, visit Zoe Chace, Why the ‘Anonymous’ 
Hackers Do What They Do, All Things Considered (NPR radio broadcast Aug. 26, 2011, 
available at www.npr.org/2011/08/26/139977284/why-the-hacker-group-anonymous-does-
what-it-does. 
206. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980); see also, supra notes 22–32 and
accompanying text. 
207. The government was also able to get all the profits from Snepp’s book, Decent
Interval.  See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text. 
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intelligence analyst, like Morison, will be convicted if the evidence 
shows guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.208 
Past precedents point to prosecuting persons who work for the 
government and then leak information gained while on the job. 
Morison is perhaps the precedent most on point for the Manning 
case.  The cases of Franklin, Rosen, and Weissman, who were 
indicted together, are also illustrative.209  Manning, who worked for 
the government, is more similarly situated to Franklin, of course, than 
to Rosen or Weissman.  Like Franklin, Manning would logically be 
the man the government has in its crosshairs.  Rosen and Weissman 
would be more similarly situated to Assange.  With a conviction or 
guilty plea from Manning, the government drive, if there be any, to 
prosecute Assange might be deflated.  In Assange’s case, the 
jurisdictional hurdles alone might make any pursuit of him seem not 
worth the effort. 
Another prosecution that could serve as a precedent in Manning’s 
case is that of Drake, a former National Security Agency senior 
executive and thus a government employee.  Drake, however, 
escaped imprisonment, and his case might help quell prosecutors’ 
ardor.210  And yet another indictment, this time of former CIA agent 
Sterling late in 2010, demonstrates that government workers who leak 
information face a real possibility of criminal prosecution.211  
Manning, again, would seem to be in the same position as Drake and 
Sterling: Government employees who leaked information.  Reporters 
Risen and Lichtblau would stand in the same position as Assange if 
Assange had clean hands in receiving secret information. 
The most famous person who worked for the government and 
then leaked information to the press is undoubtedly Ellsberg.  He 
escaped prosecution for violating the Espionage Act when he leaked 
the Pentagon Papers material to The New York Times because the 
judge at his trial concluded the government had engaged in 
misconduct.  If the government does not engage in similar misconduct 
in Manning’s case, such as breaking into his psychiatrist’s office, then 
Manning seemingly would not have the same luck as Ellsberg. 
208. Morison v. United States, 486 U.S. 1306 (1988); see also, supra notes 58–66 and
accompanying text. 
209. See supra notes 134–142 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 148–152 and accompanying text for additional discussion of
Drake. 
211. See supra notes 153–156 and accompanying text for additional discussion of
Sterling. 
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As for Assange, if he entered into a relationship with Manning to 
gain access to secret material, then he was a co-conspirator.212  Co-
conspirators, of course, can be prosecuted.  Absent a provable 
conspiracy, conviction on other matters, such as for sex crimes in 
Sweden,213 would seem the available alternative for taking Assange 
off the worldwide electronic streets.214 
XI. Conclusion
Leakers take great risks.  If allegations against Bradley Manning 
are correct, then Manning could face conviction for charges such as 
theft and violation of the Espionage Act.  Morison was convicted 
under the Espionage Act.  Franklin pleaded guilty to violating the 
Espionage Act for leaking information to the American Israeli Public 
212. Raffi Khatchadourian, who wrote the New Yorker profile of Assange cited supra
note 205, wrote this in a June 2011 blog post: 
This January, there were reports that U.S. investigators “could detect no 
contact between Manning and Assange.”  That was surprising. Manning’s 
confessions to Lamo make explicit references to direct communications 
between him and WikiLeaks.  At one point, while trying to answer a 
question, Manning writes, “I’ll have to ask Assange.”  In another burst of 
short notes, he says: (2:04:29 PM) im a source, not quite a volunteer  
(2:05:38 PM) i mean, im a high profile source … and i’ve developed a 
relationship with assange … but i dont know much more than what he 
tells me, which is very little (2:05:58 PM) it took me four months to 
confirm that the person i was communicating was in fact assange  Some 
people doubt the veracity of these logs.  I find this aspect of them to be 
consistent with what I know and what is reasonable … In May of last 
year, my piece about WikiLeaks was making its way through the last 
stages of production at The New Yorker. … I did not interview Manning 
for the article; nonetheless, while we were working on the piece, he wrote 
to Lamo on May 25th and said, “new yorker is running 10k word article 
on wl.org on 30 may, btw.” … But how could he have known specifics 
about our piece before we had published it?  The answer is pretty clear: 
someone involved in WikiLeaks, or an intermediary, told him. 
Raffi Khathadourian, Manning, Assange, and WikiLeaks, NEWS DESK, May 20, 2011, 
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2011/05/manning-assange-and-
the-espionage-act.html. 
213. See Knickerbocker, supra note 18.
214. Passage of a proposed amendment to section 798 of the Espionage Act, called the
“SHIELD” Act, would broaden the reach of the current Espionage Act and specifically 
prohibit revelations of  “human intelligence activities” (sec. 2 (4)) and “the identity of a 
classified source or informant of an element of the intelligence community of the United 
States” (sec. 2 (5)).  See S.315, introduced March 4, 2011.  If passed, the SHIELD Act 
would arguably make future leakers such as Assange an easier target for prosecutors than 
does the current Espionage Act, which was written in 1917.  See supra note 58 (further 
discussion of the Espionage Act and the SHIELD Act). 
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Affairs Committee.  Drake has been indicted for allegedly leaking 
NSA information to the media.  Sterling was indicted for allegedly 
leaking classified information to a journalist about a secret U.S. effort 
to slow some countries’ weapon development. Ellsberg might have 
been convicted had the government not bungled the case. 
Perhaps the government keeps too many secrets.  Perhaps those 
who think the government is sweeping a lot of merely embarrassing 
information under the carpet of secrecy are correct.  But perhaps 
leakers should not be the ones to determine what information should 
see the light of public scrutiny.  Julian Assange did come under attack 
for some of the sensitive information his WikiLeaks revelations 
contained. 
Clearly, leaking has become easier in the age of WikiLeaks. 
Gutenberg opened the days of the press with limited and slow 
distribution.  Now, there is no need to copy and carry volumes of 
heavy, printed material to convert it into more hard copy for slow 
distribution.  Immediate access—and the threat of immediate harm 
and no means of recall—prevail.  There is no bonfire for the Internet 
like the one that can be lit under books.  There is no Internet 
injunction that could circle the globe with an invisible force of law. 
The Internet’s ease of disclosure and immediacy of distribution 
arguably demands a different mindset than the one that prevailed in 
the age of Gutenberg.  “Leaner and meaner,” perhaps, should be the 
watchword—leaner classification of information and meaner security 
of the information that is absolutely necessary to protect.  Once the 
information is online, it is irretrievably out.  Information is out faster 
than the proverbial horse with the gate futilely shut behind it. 
Speed-of-light communication combined with a Cold War-era 
document classification system was a disaster awaiting whomever 
leaked the information to Julian Assange.  That is, it was a disaster if 
viewed from the perspective of a government intent on keeping secret 
the trivial information as well as the defensibly classified information 
necessary for security, but which government is inept at keeping 
secure.  In the gap between the government’s desire for keeping 
secrets and its execution of a way to secure secrecy, a leaker found 
ample room for acquiring information to leak.  After all, digital 
information occupies no more room than perhaps that available on a 
rewritable disk. 
The government’s failure to secure information was, to some, a 
bonanza instead of a disaster, a thing to be celebrated instead of 
bemoaned.  Dean Baquet told Frontline: 
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If you boil it down, look at what happened as a result of 
WikiLeaks.  We gained a tremendous understanding of how 
government works, how wars are conducted. Balance the 
disclosures and the impact and the importance of the 
disclosures against everybody’s fear over what was going to 
happen, seems to me it ended up OK, right?215 
Perhaps—but not so far, at least, for Bradley Manning.  For those 
who seek transparency as a goal, WikiLeaks was primarily a positive 
development.  Daniel Domscheit-Berg said this to Frontline about 
WikiLeaks: 
It has set in motion a cultural change, in some way that it has 
created this whole debate that we are having today.  What is 
secrecy?  And is there a need for secrecy? . . . The goal is not 
to get rid of all secrets in this world, but the goal is to foster 
transparency.  And that I think is a really important cause.216 
And Bill Keller, then the executive editor of The New York 
Times, said: 
I don’t want to give WikiLeaks credit for the transformation 
of the Arab world, but you know, to the extent that Tunisia 
influenced Egypt, these cables played some role in the 
overthrow of the Mubarak regime.  And these things are 
having an impact that I don’t think any of us imagined at the 
time when it was somebody was just handing us a huge trove 
of secret documents. 
Indeed, WikiLeaks and Julian Assange have received awards. 
For its work in Kenya, WikiLeaks received an Amnesty International 
award.217  And in 2011, the Sydney Peace Foundation awarded 
Assange its top award for his “exceptional courage in pursuit of 
human rights.”  Other winners of the award include Nelson Mandela 
and the Dalai Lama.218 
215. WikiSecrets, supra note 1.
216. WikiSecrets, supra note 1.
217. Khatchadourian, supra note 201.  WikiLeaks exposed the killings occurring in
Kenya.  See CNN Presents Wiki Wars, supra note 1. 
218. AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, WikiLeaks’ Assange awarded top Sydney peace prize,
NEW DELHI TELEVISION, May 11, 2011, http://www.ndtv.com/article/technology/wikileaks- 
assange-awarded-top-sydney-peace-prize-104890. 
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But the failure to sufficiently redact documents brought Assange 
criticism.  His “harm minimization” process had missed some 
informants’ names, exposing them to severe risks.219  These exposed 
informants could, perhaps, be considered the WikiLeaks form of 
“collateral damage.” 
The old question of whether the ends justify the means inevitably 
arises when some good results flow from some questionable methods. 
Arguably the jury is still out on WikiLeaks.  Maybe it will be a hung 
jury.  Thoughtful, well-informed people can disagree, as the U.S. 
Supreme Court has so aptly demonstrated on so many 5-4 occasions. 
Precedents would seem to point against legal consequences for 
Julian Assange.  Moral approbation and praise, however, both 
continue to flow toward him.  For Bradley Manning, on the other 
hand, the legal consequences appear rather dire. U.S. law does not 
favor government-employed leakers. 
While the saga of Bradley Manning unfolds, protests in his favor 
continue.  For example, on March 20, 2011, Daniel Ellsberg was 
arrested near Quantico Marine Corps Base while calling for 
Manning’s release from the prison there.  About thirty more of the 
roughly 400 protesters were also arrested.  On that same day, rallies 
for Manning occurred in at least eight other cities worldwide, 
including London, Berlin, and Sydney.220  On April 23, when President 
Obama was in San Francisco at a fundraising breakfast that cost as 
much as $35,800 per plate, a table of ten protesters started singing for 
Manning’s release.221  The protesters, who paid $5,000 per plate and 
held small “Free Bradley Manning” signs, decried Manning’s prison 
conditions.222  And on June 4, more than 200 protesters rallied at Fort 
219. Assange reportedly had not wanted to do any redaction whatsoever on the
Afghan War Logs and only did so under pressure, not giving WikiLeaks sufficient time to 
do an adequate job.  WikiSecrets, supra note 1. 
220. Darryl Fears, Protesters Arrested at Rally for Leak Support, WASH. POST, Mar.
21, 2011, at A4. 
221.  Kara Rowland, Activists disrupt Obama fundraiser; President laughs off antiwar
hecklers protesting treatment of WikiLeaks figure, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2011 at 4.  Their 
song did indicate that the protesters would still vote for Obama. 
222. They sang, among other things:  “Even though we don’t know if we’ll retain our
liberties, in what you seem content to call a free society, yes it’s true that Terry Jones is 
legally free, to burn a people’s holy book in shameful effigy, but at another location in this 
country, alone in a 6 x 12 cell sits Bradley, 23 hours a day is night, the 5th and 8th 
Amendments say this kind of thing ain’t right, we paid our dues, where’s our change?” 
Carrie Budoff Brown, Obama Gets a Singing Rebuke, POLITICO (Apr. 21, 2011, 2:10 PM), 
www.politico.com/news/stories/0411/53546.html. 
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Leavensworth, Kansas, calling for Manning’s release from the federal 
prison located there.223 
223. Jonathan M. Seidl, Over 200 Protesters Rally Outside Prison of Alleged
WikiLeaker Bradley Manning, BLAZE, June 5, 2011, http://www.theblaze.com/stories/over-
200-protesters-rally-outside-prison-of-alleged-wikileaker-bradley-manning/; see also,
Hundreds protest at Kansas Military Base for Manning Release, DEMOCRACY NOW!, June
6, 2011, available at http://www.democracynow.org/2011/6/6/headlines/hundreds_protest_
at_kansas_military_ base_for_manning_release.
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